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REASSESSING THE AVOIDANCE CANON
IN ERIE CASES
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article chronicles the Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of an avoidance
canon in cases construing the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling Act
(Enabling Act or REA). 1 It focuses primarily on the avoidance canon as used in cases
under the REA branch of the Erie doctrine 2 but also discusses avoidance in other
REA contexts. The Article concludes that a reassessment and refocusing of the
avoidance canon in Enabling Act jurisprudence is necessary. Avoidance, as used in
the REA analysis under Erie, has varied over the years, with the Court often
construing Federal Rules narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law, 3 (and
sometimes construing against any meaning that the text and history of the Federal
Rule at issue would appear to bear to avoid the conflict 4), sometimes construing
Federal Rules broadly and seeming to reach out to find conflict where conflict was
not necessary, 5 and, most recently, engaging avoidance issues directly, but
disagreeing about the extent and nature of an appropriate rule of avoidance under
the REA. 6 If avoidance is appropriate in Enabling Act jurisprudence, and each of the
opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent Erie case, Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 7 appears to conclude that some form of
avoidance is appropriate, 8 the Court should identify an appropriate guiding purpose
and methodology for avoidance. This Article explores when avoidance is
appropriate in Enabling Act jurisprudence and identifies the purposes that should
animate avoidance.
Through the REA, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court authority to
promulgate prospective rules to govern procedure in the federal courts. Under this

1 Act of June 19, 1934, § 1 Publ. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2006)).
2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to
the Confusion – But Should Not Have, ___ AKRON. L. REV. ___, ___ n.9 (noting that the term “Erie doctrine”
applies to all vertical choice of law issues, including those under the REA).
3 See, e.g., Gaspirini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, n.7, 437 & n.22 (1996); Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 & n.10 (1980); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001) (construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) narrowly, in part, to avoid
abridging, enlarging, or modifying state law and, in part, to avoid violating the federalism principle of
Erie).
4 See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501-05; Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10.
5 See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987); Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 29-32 (1988) (construing federal statute broadly when in potential conflict with state
law).
6 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); see infra notes 281351, and accompanying text.
7 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
8 Id. at 1441-42 & nn.7-8 (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court); id. at 1450-52 & nn.5-6 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 1455-69 & nn.2, 8, 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

delegation, Congress gave broad authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate
general rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts (Federal Rules or
Rules 9), and it elevated the status of properly promulgated, i.e., “valid” Federal
Rules. Valid Federal Rules will (1) supersede existing, conflicting procedural
statutes of Congress by reason of the provision of the REA often referred to as the
“supersession clause”; 10 and (2) preempt state procedure by reason of the
Supremacy Clause 11 when the Rules of Decision Act (RDA) 12 would otherwise call
for federal courts to use state law. 13

The Hanna v. Plumer 14 decision recognized an important doctrinal division
between cases presenting potential conflicts between state law and judge-made law
and those cases presenting apparent conflicts between state law and congressional
statutes or Federal Rules. 15 The Hanna Court categorized cases pitting state law and
federal judge-made law as implicating a “relatively unguided Erie choice” under the
Rules of Decision Act (RDA). I refer to these cases as requiring an “RDA analysis.”
The Hanna Court also recognized that cases involving potential clashes of federal
statute or Federal Rules and state law require a different, and less searching
analysis. 16 I focus, in this Article, primarily on a subset of this group of cases – cases
presenting potential conflicts between state law and Federal Rules promulgated by
9

“Federal Rule” or “Rule” refers to rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act process. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2006).
10 The “supersession” clause of the REA authorizes valid Federal Rules to supersede existing,
conflicting federal statutes: “All laws in conflict with [Federal Rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(2006). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1033-36 (1989)
(discussing the supersession clause and Congress’s 1989 attempt to repeal that clause); Bernadette
Bollas Genetin, The Powers That Be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts’ Rulemaking and
Adjudicatory Powers in the Context of a Clash of a Congressional Statue and a Supreme Court Rule, 57
BAYLOR L. REV. 587, 598-606 (2005) [hereinafter Genetin, Powers That Be] (discussing the importance
of considering Court and congressional rulemaking authority in apparent clashes between federal
statutes and Federal Rules); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals
Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules,
51 EMORY L.J. 677, 726-29, 736-46 (2002) [hereinafter Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional
Statutes and Federal Rules] (proposing a framework for resolving conflicts between federal statutes
and Federal Rules that would include examination of Court’s authority under the substantive rights
limitation of the REA); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1047-49 (1993) (discussing the proposed, but
unsuccessful, 1988 amendments to the REA to repeal the supersession clause).
11 U.S. CONST. art. IV.
12 The Rules of Decision Act was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 34, 1
Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)). It provides as follows: “The laws of the several
States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.”
13
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-65, 469-74 (1965).
14 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
15
Id. at 469-74. See also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 697-99,
718-21 (1974).
16
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-65, 469-74.
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the Supreme Court under the REA, and I refer to the analysis for these conflicts as
requiring an “REA analysis.” Hanna established that a Federal Rule will be
considered valid, for purposes of an REA analysis, when it is both constitutional17
and in compliance with the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling Act, 18
which provides that a Federal Rule may not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.” 19

Although at the time of the 1934 enactment of the REA, the Court, Congress,
and federal rulemakers arguably considered substance and procedure to be easily
separable categories, with procedure serving simply as a means of implementing
substantive goals, 20 commentators have long since concluded that substance and
procedure are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they overlap in significant part, thus,
rendering the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling Act difficult to
define. 21 Indeed, Professor Doernberg has concluded that “[t]hree quarters of a
century after Congress passed REA, we still lack an analytical technique for making
the admittedly difficult decisions about whether something is substantive or
procedural for REA purposes where rational arguments exist for either
characterization.” 22
This is the case, in part, I conclude, because the Court has consistently
declined to address the issue. But the failure to derive an adequate translation of
the substance-procedure distinction for REA purposes has not resulted in mere
doctrinal untidiness. The substance-procedure divide allocates power between

Id. at 472 (stating that the “constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause)” provides congressional authority to make procedural rules which,
“though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either”).
18 Id. 472-74. The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), likewise each conceded the continuing validity of the
Hanna framework for REA issues. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (opinion of the Court); id. at 144849 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19 The substantive rights limitation of the REA provides that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
20 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, To Encourage Settlement: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1612-13 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, To
Encourage Settlement]; Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893-97 (1999) [hereinafter, Bone, Process of
Making Process]; Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
801, 804-18 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 945-47, 962 (1987).
21
See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 900-02; Main, supra note 20, at 810-11
(concluding that “substance” and “procedure” have been codified as though they were dichotomies and
“characterized by mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive categories” when they, instead, constitute an
antinomy, in which some laws can be “both substantive and procedural . . . [and some can] be neither
substantive or procedural”); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 374-75, 399-409 (2010).
22 Doernberg, supra note 2, at ___ n.294
17
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Congress and the Supreme Court, 23 limiting the Court to promulgation of Federal
Rules that do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Failure to
identify an adequate analytical method for determining when a Court-created Rule
impermissibly impacts substantive rights has led the Court to use avoidance
techniques in the various scenarios in which the substantive-procedural distinction
arises under the REA: (1) in the context of the Court’s promulgation of Federal
Rules; 24 (2) in instances in which Federal Rules conflict with congressional
statutes; 25 and (3) in instances in which Federal Rules are in potential conflict with
state law. 26 The Court’s use of avoidance in Rule promulgation has resulted in in
unique costs and benefits. It has permitted promulgation of open-textured Rules
that permit nominal transsubstantivity of the Rules, 27 but this has only deferred
defining the substantive-procedural divide to the Rule interpretation context.
Although I focus primarily on the third scenario – instances in which a Federal Rule
is in potential conflict with state law (the REA analysis) – I suggest that attending to
each of the scenarios that implicate the substantive-procedural divide of the REA is
important to understanding the limitations of any one.

The difficulty of articulating an adequate definition of the substantiveprocedural divide for purposes of the Erie doctrine, resulted in the Court’s
development in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 28 of a functional “outcome-determinative”
test, which, as interpreted uncompromisingly by the Supreme Court, endangered
See, e.g., Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025-26, 1106-07, 111314 (1982); Burbank, supra note 10, at 1016; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and
Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 688; Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 92-94 (1998).
24 Professor Burbank indicates that the original Advisory Committee appointed in 1935 “had no
coherent or consistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act’s procedure/substance dichotomy.”
Burbank, supra note 23, at 1132. Professor Burbank also notes that the Advisory Committee
“approached [problems of power] without a shared conception of the [REA’s] limitations, . . . that the
resolution of these problems were, therefore, essentially ad hoc. . . , and in applying the [REA’s]
limitations, normative considerations took a back seat to practical possibilities.” Id. at 1133-35; see
also id. at 1135-57. Far from using an avoidance rationale consistently to stay comfortably within an
acceptable procedural realm, the Advisory Committee sometimes heeded the substantive rights
limitation on power and sometimes did not. Id.
25 See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox, 424 U.S. 523, 542-44 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Accord Genetin, Conflicts
Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 731 (concluding that “if [a]
Federal Rule appears to clash with a federal statute because it appears to abridge substantive rights
impermissibly, the court would, if consistent with the context of statute and Rule, prefer a
construction in which the Federal Rule would not impermissibly impact substantive rights”);
Kelleher, supra note 23, at 442 (emphasizing that the Court has begun to take the “substantive rights
limitation more seriously, particularly as a rule of construction and to read Rules narrowly when
necessary to avoid infirmity”).
26 See infra Sections II.B and II.C.2.a.
27 Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules, and Common Law,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988); Marcus, supra note 21, at 394-95, 416-21.
28 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
23
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the Federal Rules in the context of potentially conflicting state law. 29 Indeed, a short
twelve years after the promulgation of the original Federal Rules, Charles Clark
lamented that, given the “drastic logic” with which the Supreme Court implemented
Guaranty Trust’s outcome determinative test, “hardly a one of the heralded Federal
Rules can be considered safe from attack by shrewd lawyers and obedient lower
tribunals.” 30 The Court did, in some pre-Hanna cases, construe the Federal Rule
narrowly to avoid a conflict between Federal Rule and state law, 31 but that
avoidance had curious results for the Federal Rules. Construing Rule and state law
to conflict meant, under the virtually absolute conformity ultimately required under
Guaranty Trust, that state law would apply, 32 but, of course, construing the Federal
Rule not to conflict also triggered the application of state law. In effect, avoidance
may have had some formal benefit in preserving the Federal Rule, but, as a practical
matter, it was inconsequential. In either case, the Federal Rule would be
subordinated, and state law would apply alone or in tandem with the Federal Rule. 33
Moreover, the Court’s decision to defer to state law under the outcome
determinative test resulted in dual meanings for Federal Rules – one that applied in
diversity cases and a second in federal question cases. 34
The Court ultimately countered with an overcorrection in Hanna v. Plumer, 35
creating a test for Rule validity under the REA, in event of a conflict between Federal
Rule and state law, that established the Federal Rules as virtually invulnerable to
suggestions that they might impermissibly abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive
rights. 36 This had important consequences for Federal Rules: It meant that Federal
Rules could be interpreted uniformly; indeed, the Hanna Court emphasized that

E.g., Bernard C. Gavit, States’ Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 3, 24-26 (1949); Alfred
Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW U. L. REV. 427, 429-34 (1958); Edward Lawrence
Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan – A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 711-12, 71725 (1950); Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 506-09, 513, 525 (1949);
Charles E. Clark, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 181, 182-84 (1950) (book
review).
30 Clark, supra note 29, at 183 (1950).
31 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109, 116-17 (1943). Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956) (using
avoidance in apparent conflict between federal statute and state law).
32
E.g., Gavit, supra note 29, at 1-3; Hill, supra note 29, at 429-37; Merrigan, supra note 29, at 717-18,
723-25; Clark, supra note 29, at 183.
33
See infra notes 91-152, and accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., Gavit, supra note 29, at 3, 25-26; Merrigan, supra note 29, at 717-719, 721.
35 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
36 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637,
1643 (1998) (noting that “overzealous application of Hanna . . . [in Burlington Northern Railroad Co.
v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1987) and Stewart Organization., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-32
(1988)] was so stark that one might be forgiven for becoming cynical; the tie-breaker in vertical
choice of law was that the federal provision wins by invocation of Hanna”); John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal
Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L.
REV. 283, 289 (2008) (describing the “really regulates procedure” principle of Hanna as “a test the
rules cannot fail”).
29
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uniformity of application was “[o]ne of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules.” 37
A Federal Rule would be considered valid after Hanna if the Rule “’really regulate[d]
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing the rights and duties recognized by
substantive law, and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them’” 38 an illusory standard that drew immediate and consistent
criticism 39 (but which a plurality of the Supreme Court has reaffirmed in the Shady
Grove opinion 40). The hoped-for uniformity, however, has not materialized.

In the post-Hanna context, avoidance could play a major role as the Court
itself illustrated in the Hanna opinion, 41 and, in post-Hanna cases, the Court has
regularly invoked an avoidance canon, this time to prevent the potential
overprotection of the Federal Rules (and consequent underprotection of state
substantive law) under the Rule-protective standard for validity established in
Hanna. The Court’s construction of the scope of a Federal Rule – or whether the
Rule “cover[ed] the point in dispute” 42 -- however, has varied in post-Hanna cases,
and its use of an avoidance canon of Rule interpretation has been uneven.
Commentators have suggested, moreover, that the Court’s recent use of an
avoidance canon 43 not only avoids conflict between Federal Rule and state law, but
it essentially rewrites the Federal Rules at issue in order to avoid the conflict. 44
Others have concluded that the Court’s use of avoidance has taken on an ad hoc
quality that provides little guidance to lower courts. 45 A slim majority of the
Supreme Court has signaled in Shady Grove that it will abandon that use of the
37

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)). See also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (indicating that
the “cardinal purpose” of Congress in enacting the REA was “the development of a uniform and consistent
system of rules governing federal practice and procedure”).
38 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
39 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1453 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing and approving scholarly criticism of the
standard). See also Doernberg, supra note 2, at page 19 of 43; John C. McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer:
The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 887, 901-04 (1965)
40 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43 (2010).
41 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12.
42
Id. at 470. Whether a Rule and state law are in conflict has been variously articulated, including whether
“when fairly construed, the scope of . . . the Federal Rule . . . is ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct
collision’ with the state law or, implicitly to ‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving no room
for the operation of state law.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987).
43 Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-37 & n.22 (1996).
44 See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s
Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708, 727 (2006); see also Stephen B.
Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1042-46
(2002); Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,: Justice
Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 118-24 (2010).
45 See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 708, 727 (noting that the Court has resorted to
“case-by-case determinations” and to “ad hoc departures from the literal terms of a Federal Rule and
its commonly understood meaning “to resolve Erie issues implicating the Federal Rules).
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avoidance canon, 46 but the remaining justices would pursue avoidance out of
respect for important state interests and regulatory policies. 47

In summary, in a post-Hanna world, much rides on a court’s determination of
whether the scope of a Federal Rule, “when fairly construed,” is “’sufficiently broad’
to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue
before the court,’ thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.” 48 The
“conflict” decision mediates between use of the RDA analysis, which virtually
assures primacy of state law, and use of an REA analysis, which, under either the
“really regulates procedure” principle of Hanna 49 or the seemingly more searching
inquiry into whether a Rule “affects[s] litigants’ substantive rights” more than
“incidentally” under Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 50 has virtually
assured that the Federal Rule will preempt state law. Two strands of avoidance
have emerged in the Court’s recent REA cases under Erie: (1) avoidance based
primarily on an intent to “interpre[t] the federal rules to avoid conflict with
important state regulatory policies” 51 and sometimes incorporating a type of
interest balancing approach; and (2) avoidance resembling more nearly the canon
to construe against serious constitutional doubts and guided by goals of preventing
“arguabl[e] violat[ion] of the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act” and
violation of the “federalism principles of Erie.” 52
I reach two primary conclusions regarding the avoidance canon in this
Article. Preliminarily, an avoidance canon is inadequate, standing alone, to
satisfactorily divide substance and procedure for purposes of the REA. An
avoidance principle necessarily presupposes some shared understanding of the
standard to be avoided. Although commentators have celebrated the Court’s use of
an avoidance canon of Rule interpretation as signaling the Court’s intent to take
substantive rights in the Rules Enabling Act more seriously, 53 the Court must

46 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440-42 & nn.7-8 (2010)
(opinion of the Court); id. at 1451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
47 Id. at 1461-1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) (citing Walker v. Armco Steel. Corp. 446 U.S.
740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980) and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1965)).
49
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
50
Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5-6 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65; Miss. Publ’g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4509, at 145-46 (1982)).
51
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-37 & n.22 (1996). See also Lynch,
supra note 36, at 321-26 (proposing comparative impairment for resolving conflicts between Federal
Rules and state law, in the limited context of state litigation reform legislation); McCoid, supra note
39, at 912-14 (suggesting that the Hanna Court should have used a comparative impairment
analysis).
52
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
53
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1677, 1712-14, 1736-37 (2004); Genetin, Powers That Be, supra note 10, at 592; Genetin,
Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 728 & n.241; Leslie M.
Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act
and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 442 (2000).
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develop an administrable means of applying the substance-procedure distinction of
the REA. Identifying a proper standard is beyond the scope of this Article, but
among the likely candidates are proposals of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in the
Shady Grove opinion, the standard established in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods, 54 and recent suggestions in scholarly commentary. 55

Second, the varying rationales for avoidance should be unified and
recalibrated to serve the separation of powers goals that underlie Congress’s
inclusion of the substantive rights limitation in the REA. Further, the Court should
develop an avoidance canon analogous to the so-called “serious doubts” or
“modern” avoidance canon of statutory construction that prefers an interpretation
of a statute, when possible, that will avoid serious constitutional doubts. 56
Correspondingly, in the REA context, the Court should construe a Federal Rule that
is in potential conflict with state law to avoid serious questions regarding a Rule’s
violation of the substantive rights limitation of the REA, but only if there is a
plausible interpretation of the Rule that would permit avoidance. In determining
whether avoidance is permissible, the Court should, in line with its use of avoidance
in other Enabling Act contexts, 57 construe a Rule in accord with the Rule’s text,
history, and purposes, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes. 58
54

480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987).
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Shady Grove would adhere to a standard of whether a Rule
“really regulates procedure.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens, in concurrence in Shady Grove, suggests that
the substantive rights limitation precludes Federal Rules that “would displace a state law that is
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452-53 & n.8-9
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987), the Court held that “[t]he cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing
development of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and procedure
suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate . . . [the
substantive rights] provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of
rules.” Professor Doernberg submits two suggestions, which he refers to as the “elements” approach
and the “behavioral” approach, that are each likely candidates for this position. Doernberg, supra
note 2, at ___ Under the “elements” approach, the court would consider whether the state law and
Federal Rule at issue “tend to establish or negate an element of the claimant’s cause of action or a
defense on the merits.” Id. at ___. A court following the “behavioral” approach would ask “whether,
before the litigation began and assuming the parties were fully aware of the competing rules, they
would rationally have ordered their conduct in accord with one of the rules.” Id. at __.
56
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 138-39
(2010); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997); Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1549, 1575-76 (2000).
57
See infra notes 223-259, and accompanying text.
58
Compare Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1124-41, 1147 (2002) (suggesting that the nature of the Enabling Act
process and reality of the rulemaking process counsel restraint in Court construction of Federal Rules, that
the Court consider the Enabling Act process, and that it “give[] authoritative weight to the Advisory
Committee Notes”), with Moore, supra note 10, at 1047-53 (1993) (proposing that the Supreme Court use
an active or dynamic interpretation of the Rules it promulgates). See also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 48-49
55
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Section II of this Article traces the Court’s use of an avoidance canon in Erie,
REA cases 59 and in non-Erie, REA cases. 60 Section II dwells on the pre-Hanna
period, reminding that the Court’s use of outcome-determinative principles under
Guaranty Trust minimized the pre-Hanna role of avoidance, 61 subordinated Federal
Rules to state law, and resulted in differing interpretations of Federal Rules in
diversity and federal question cases. Section II then examines avoidance in postHanna, Erie cases. In these cases, the Court has generally construed Federal Rules
narrowly with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies. This
federalism focus for avoidance permits state law to override Federal Rules and
permits the “two plain meanings” for Federal Rules that commentators disparage in
the Court’s post-Hanna avoidance decisions. 62 It, thus, permits replication, Rule-byRule, of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative results -- subordination of Federal
Rules and dual interpretations of Federal Rules in diversity and federal question
cases. Section II, finally, examines the Court’s use of avoidance in non-Erie, REA
cases in which the Court has generally used serious doubts avoidance and has
adopted saving constructions of Federal Rules that are more faithful to Rule text and
Rule purposes and history as set forth in Advisory Committee materials.

Section III examines the views in the plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Shady Grove regarding the extent and nature of an appropriate
avoidance canon. In these opinions, the Justices draw on elements of the Court’s
historical use of avoidance in REA cases to suggest three competing avoidance
principles. Justice Scalia, in dicta, proposes a type of “classical” or “narrow”
avoidance; 63 Justice Stevens, in concurrence, suggests a broader avoidance canon
modeled on “serious doubts” principles, which would counsel avoidance if the most
natural construction of a Rule would raise serious doubts about the Rule’s validity
under the REA; 64 and Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, advocates avoidance based almost
solely on respect for important state interests and regulatory policies. 65
In Section IV, I conclude that avoidance in REA cases under Erie should be
based on separation of powers principles and should incorporate a serious doubts
methodology. This includes aspects of Justice Stevens’s approach in Shady Grove. I

(2010) (advocating that unless a Federal Rule “actually makes a policy choice that Congress has had an
opportunity to review [following its prescribed Enabling Act process] . . . the role that federal common law
plays in providing content that the rulemakers did not prospectively entertain should be recognized” and
emphasizing as well that “many, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters for discretionary
decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the actual choices to federal trial judges”).
59
See infra notes 91-152 and 186-220, and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 223-259, and accompanying text.
61
Although the Court limited the outcome determinative principle of Guaranty Trust in its decision in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the Court did not use avoidance in REA cases
between the Byrd and Hanna cases.
62
See supra note 197, and accompanying text.
63
See infra notes 308-313, and accompanying text.
64
See infra notes 322-338, and accompanying text.
65
See infra notes 346-353, and accompanying text.
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also discuss the advantages of a serious doubts avoidance model for Rule
construction.
II. AVOIDANCE IN ENABLING ACT CASES

In many ways, avoidance has, from the very enactment of the Rules Enabling Act,
been the defining characteristic of the Court’s construction of the substantiveprocedural divide in the REA, in general, and in the REA branch of the Erie doctrine,
in particular. Professor Burbank relates that, from the start, the original rulemakers
lacked a coherent view of the dividing line between substance and procedure. 66 In
promulgating the original Federal Rules pursuant to the REA, the rulemakers, thus,
avoided the substantive-procedural divide, in some instances, by incorporating state
law 67 or existing federal law (based on federal statutes and federal common law) 68
into a Federal Rule and, in other instances by promulgating general Rules that
conferred broad, general discretion on trial judges. 69 In amending the Rules,
contemporary rulemakers often avoid promulgating Rules that might be construed
as substantive 70 and promulgate discretionary Rules that leave normative decisions
to trial court judges. 71

Similarly, in construing potential Federal Rule-state law conflicts under Erie, the
Court has often avoided addressing the substantive-procedural divide. This Section
traces the history of the Court’s use of avoidance in Enabling Act cases. Section II.A
lays the groundwork by discussing the substantive rights limitation of the REA.
Sections II.B and C examine the avoidance canon, as the Court has employed it in
pre-Hanna, Erie cases, in its post-Hanna, Erie cases, and in other Enabling Act
contexts. Sections II.B. and C reveal that, under the outcome-determinative
standard of Guaranty Trust, Federal Rules appeared uniformly to yield to conflicting
state law, and the Court occasionally used avoidance as a means of protecting the
Federal Rule. 72 The Supreme Court ultimately reaffirmed the superiority of valid
Federal Rules over conflicting state law in Hanna v. Plumer and set a fairly high bar
for finding Rules invalid under the REA. 73 Rather than using Hanna’s stringent
standard to override conflicting state law, however, the Court has used avoidance
based on federalism principles and construing Rules narrowly (and sometimes

Burbank, supra note 23, at 1332-37, 1145-46.
Id. at 1145-47.
68 Id. at 1147-57.
69
Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324
(2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules]; Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at
Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1967-68, 1972-73 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who
Decides?]
70
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 21, at 413-14.
71
See, e.g., Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 69, at 326-37; Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 69, at
1974-75; Burbank, supra note 27, at 715; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1473-75 (1987) (book review); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:
An Essay on Adjusting the “One-Size-Fits-All” Assumption, 87 DENV. L. REV. 377, 391 (2010).
72
See infra notes 91-161, and accompanying text.
73
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74 (1965).
66
67
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contrary to text and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes) to find that Federal
Rule and state law do not conflict. This results in state law controlling under an RDA
analysis and can, Rule-by-Rule, reintroduce the outcome determinative results of
Guaranty Trust. Section II concludes by showing that this method of avoidance has
threatened the integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent system, and that the
method varies from the avoidance canon the Court uses in its non-Erie, REA cases.
A. The Substantive Rights Limitation of the REA

In the original Rules Enabling Act, Congress delegated authority to the Supreme
Court to promulgate general rules of practice and procedure for the lower federal
courts, but it limited that authority to promulgation of Rules that would not
“abridge, enlarge or modify any litigant’s substantive rights.” 74 The prohibition on
Court-made Rules that impermissibly impact substantive rights has been modified
by amendment to the REA and today provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts . . . .
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . . 75

Professor Burbank’s scholarship has been instrumental in clarifying that the
substantive rights prohibition was originally included in the REA as a separation or
allocation of powers provision. 76 The substantive rights limitation was intended to
separate the permissible bounds of the Supreme Court’s prospective procedural
rulemaking from the impermissible substantive realm, in which Court rulemaking
would trench impermissibly on Congress’s substantive lawmaking prerogative. 77
The REA, thus, delegates Congress’s prospective procedural lawmaking authority to
the Court, 78 but it also confines Court rulemaking to the procedural and, moreover,
to procedural Rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 79

Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
76 See, e.g,. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26, 1106-14.
77 Id.
78 Through the REA, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court its power to create procedural rules
for the federal courts. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress has the power, under
Articles I and III of the Constitution, to make procedural rules. Article I authorizes Congress to
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,” see U.S. CONST., art 1, § 8, cl.9, and also
authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to execute the powers vested in it by the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.18. Article III also permits Congress to “vest judicial Power .
. . in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1. The Supreme Court has also long recognized that Congress has the power to delegate procedural
rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386-88
(1989); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 42-45 (1825).
79 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1107-08 (concluding that the first sentence of the REA, which
authorizes the Court to promulgate “general rules of practice and procedure” imposes significant,
74
75
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Originally, there was little need for Congress to patrol this divide carefully.
Congress, the Court, and commentators shared a vision of a fairly abrupt divide
between substance and procedure. 80 Procedure, they concluded, was different in
kind and subservient to substantive law. 81 The Supreme Court, moreover, enjoyed
expertise in procedural matters. Thus, for nearly forty years after the enactment of
the REA, Congress entered a period of rulemaking passivity, in which it deferred to
the procedural expertise of the Supreme Court and generally declined to enact
substantive legislation that included procedural provisions, declined to enact
amendments to Federal Rules promulgated by the Court, and declined to object to
Federal Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. 82

In the then-existing climate of congressional forbearance in procedural
rulemaking, the role of the substantive rights provision in creating a boundary that
allocated prospective lawmaking authority between the Court and Congress blurred.
Court Rules were generally considered the equivalent of statutes. 83 Moreover, given
Congress’s acquiescence in Court rulemaking, conflicts between congressional
statutes and Federal Rules, which I have previously referred to as “statute-Rule
conflicts,” 84 rarely arose. 85 In the few instances in which such conflicts did arise, the
question of the Court’s rulemaking authority under the substantive rights provision
of the REA, though not nonexistent, assumed lesser importance, not only because of
the relative infrequence of statute-Rule conflicts, but also because of the prevailing
assumptions of Court expertise and broad rulemaking authority and the seeming
triviality of the issues that arose. 86
procedural restrictions on Court rulemaking and that the second sentence, which contains the
prohibition that Rules may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” is not an
independent limitation, but is essentially “surplusage”).
80 Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 69, at 1971-72; Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at
894-96; Subrin, supra note 20, at 945-47, 962. Toward the end of this time period, the idea of a strict
separation between substance and procedure was receding, but the proponents of the REA persisted
in seeking passage of a bill premised on a dichotomy between substance and procedure.
81 See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 894-96.
82 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 (3d ed. 2010);
Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 694-96
83 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 82, at 1030 & n.1; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes
and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 680-82, 701-05 (discussing how courts typically resolve clashes
between a congressional statute and Federal Rule through an “implied repeal analysis,” in which the
courts often treat the statute and Rule as though they were two provisions created by the same
lawmaker, rather than provisions of lawmakers with uneven authority).
84 Id. at 681.
85 Id. at 751.
86 Id. at 751 & n.343 (indicating that the few applications of the supersession clause included
appellate rules that superseded legislation regarding time to appeal, whether printing costs were
taxable, and certain fees in admiralty appeals). Professors Burbank and Wolff suggest as well that
the Court may have believed that a federalism perspective could enhance its rulemaking power and
the integrity of the Rules. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 58, at 29.
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During the forty years in which congressional procedural passivity limited the
importance of the substantive rights provision as an arbiter of potential
congressional statute-Federal Rule conflicts, however, the role of the substantive
rights provision of the REA was assuming increasing importance in Erie cases.
Although federalism interests are not irrelevant in inquiries regarding the Court’s
compliance with the substantive rights limitation of the REA, they are furthered not
as a primary purpose of the REA’s substantive rights limitation, but as a secondary
effect of that allocation. 87 That is, to the extent that Congress does not enact
legislation in an area and to the extent that the Court does not promulgate Rules, or
rulemaking would intrude on Congress’s substantive legislative prerogative (e.g., to
the extent that Court Rules would abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right),
state law, if any, will govern. Of course, in some cases, the Federal Rule at issue may
be augmented by federal common law, which would also override state law. 88
Nevertheless, at least in part because of the few opportunities, from 1938 to the
1970s, to consider the separation of powers purposes of the REA in confrontations
between congressional statutes and Federal Rules, 89 the stage was set for the Court,
in its Erie cases, to key on the secondary federalism aspects of the substantive rights
limitation rather than the primary separation of powers purposes. Indeed,
federalism purposes have long animated the Court’s avoidance canon in Erie cases, 90
and it is only in the plurality and concurring opinions of Shady Grove that the Court
has begun to deemphasize federalism interests in its avoidance analysis.
B. The Avoidance Canon in Erie’s Pre-Hanna Cases

In pre-Hanna cases featuring Federal Rule-statelaw conflicts, the Supreme Court
used an avoidance canon sporadically to avoid resolving substantive-procedural
issues, but avoidance had little practical significance. Working to offset the practical
import of any avoidance canon of Rule interpretation were two significant decisions
that put the integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent unit in jeopardy – Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 91 which introduced the outcome-determinative principle that
would dominate Erie jurisprudence until 1958, 92 and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 93 which applied outcome determination in the context of a Federal
Rule and concluded that state law would control. 94 After Guaranty Trust, avoidance

Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26, 1106-12.
Id.; Genetin, Powers That Be, supra note 10, at 591-92, 610-12.
89 Henry P. Chandler, Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System, 31 F.R.D. 307, 514-15 (1963);
Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 443 & n.40 (1958);
Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 751 & n.351.
90
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 & n.7, 436-37 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
751-52 & nn.12-13 (1980).
91 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
92 In 1958, the Supreme Court reduced the impact of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative
principle when it introduced an interest balancing approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
93 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
94 Id.
87
88
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became the better part of Rule validity in pre-Hanna cases. 95 It was an ineffective
kind of avoidance that the Court adopted, however, that could not protect the
Federal Rule as a practical matter: If a Federal Rule were construed narrowly to
avoid conflict with state law, the Federal Rule survived as a formal matter, but both
Federal Rule and state-law controlled because, absent a conflict, courts applied state
law under the outcome-determinative principle of Guaranty Trust. 96 If, however,
Federal Rule and state law did conflict, the state law also controlled, based on
application of Guaranty Trust’s outcome determinative formulation. 97 Thus, the
Federal Rules were consistently on the losing end of the tossup in a paradigmatic
heads-I-win, tails-you-lose scenario. The uniformity, predictability, and coherence
of procedure in the federal courts sought by Congress through the Federal Rules
were immediately imperiled, and Judge Charles Clark’s lamentation that “hardly a
one of the heralded Federal Rules can be considered safe from attack” reflected
reality. 98
The Court first used avoidance in Rule interpretation in the 1943 case of Palmer
v. Hoffman, 99 at a time (before the Guaranty Trust decision) when the Court
approached Erie issues by determining if an issue was substantive or procedural. 100
Avoidance mattered. If the issue were deemed procedural, the Federal Rule would
prevail over state law in event of conflict; 101 if deemed substantive, state law would
govern in event of conflict. 102 In Palmer, 103 the Supreme Court avoided finding a
conflict between Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), which seemed to catalogue affirmative defenses,
and state law, which allocated the burden of proving contributory negligence. The
Court determined that the issue of burden of proof was substantive. 104 Absent
avoidance, state law would have controlled. Avoidance was, thus, used to shield the
Federal Rule, rather than to protect “important state interests” or “regulatory
policies.” 105 The Court’s analysis paralleled what scholars have referred to, in the
constitutional avoidance context as “narrow” or “classical avoidance,” 106 under

E.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of Am., 350 198, 202 (1956) (employing avoidance in a case of apparent federal statute-state law
conflict); see also id. at 207-08 (Frankfurter, J, concurring); see also Gavit, supra note 29, at 1, 3; Hill,
supra note 29, at 429-34 (emphasizing that Federal Rules and statutes were imperiled under rigid
application of outcome-determinative principles); Merrigan, supra note 29, at 711-12, 721-23.
96 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also e.g., Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555-56.
97 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
98 Clark, supra note 29, at 183-84. See also infra notes 114-161, and accompanying text.
99 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
100
See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1941).
101
Id. at 10-11.
102 Id.
103 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
104 Id. at 116-17.
105
Some contemporary cases incorrectly reference Palmer v. Hoffman for the proposition that it evidences
avoidance to protect important state interests and regulatory policies. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1462, 1468 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 The so-called “narrow” or “classical” avoidance is also referred to as the “unconstitutionality”
canon. It provides that when “one interpretation of a statute would render it unconstitutional, the
95
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which, if there are “two possible constructions of a statute, one of which would
render the statute unconstitutional and the other of which would not, the court will
adopt the interpretation that will not result in unconstitutionality. 107 The classical
avoider does not avoid the constitutional (or, in REA cases, the substantive rights)
decision, but decides that question and then interprets the statute, if possible, to
avoid an unconstitutional construction. 108

The Palmer Court employed an analogous avoidance methodology. The district
court had allocated to the defendant the burden of proving contributory negligence,
although the defendant contended state law would have burdened the plaintiff. 109
The Plaintiff defended the district court’s decision in the Supreme Court by arguing
that Rule 8(c) made contributory negligence an affirmative defense in the federal
courts. 110 Rule 8(c) could have been so interpreted. It provided that “[i]n
responding to a pleading a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense, including . . . contributory negligence. . . .” 111 With a scant, onesentence explanation, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument and construed Rule
8(c) to avoid conflict with state law, holding that Rule 8(c) did not allocate the
burden of proving contributory negligence, but dealt only with the manner of
pleading. 112 By construing Rule 8(c) as a rule of pleading only, the Court did avoid
the conflict between Federal Rule and state law. Having lost touch with the context
of the Palmer case, current courts will use the case to support construing Federal
Rules narrowly to protect important state interests. 113 In fact, narrow construction
of the Federal Rule in Palmer prevented Rule 8(c) from yielding to the state law’s
conflicting apportionment of burden of proof.
Two important cases, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 114 and Ragan, 115 fundamentally
altered the Erie landscape before the Court returned to avoidance techniques in

court should adopt any plausible interpretation that would avoid the question.” See, e.g., Barrett,
supra note 56, at 138-39 (citing John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1496 (1997) and referring to the canon as the “unconstitutionality” canon to distinguish it
from the “doubts” version of avoidance); Vermeule, supra note 56, at 1949 (referring to the narrower
avoidance principle as “classical” avoidance and noting that the difference between “classical” and
“modern” avoidance is “that the former requires the court to determine that one plausible
interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires only a determination
that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional” (emphasis in original)); Young, supra note 56,
at 1578-79 (using the terms “classical” and “modern”).
107 Vermeule, supra note 56, at 1959 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes,
concurring) (emphasis added in article); see also Barrett, supra note 56, at 138-39; Young, supra note
56, at 1578-79.
108 The “classical” avoidance doctrine has largely been supplanted by “modern” or “serious doubts”
avoidance that permits a court to seek a less preferable construction of a statute if the most natural
construction might be unconstitutional. Vermeule, supra note 56, at 1949.
109
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943).
110 Id. at 117.
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (1938).
112 Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117.
113
See supra note 105.
114 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

15

Rule interpretation. These cases would also stall any significant development of
avoidance in pre-Hanna cases by rendering the avoidance decision of formal import
only.

Given the difficulty of dividing substance and procedure, the Supreme Court, in
Guaranty Trust, embraced avoidance. 116 It adopted a functional approach,
ultimately referred to as the “outcome-determinative” approach, that would serve
the “policy” of Erie 117 and would make unnecessary determination of the
substantive-procedural divide. Emphasizing that the policy of the Erie opinion
“touche[d] vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and
federal courts,” 118 the Guaranty Trust Court concluded that the intent of the Erie
decision was to ensure uniformity of outcome in federal and state courts:
In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity
of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. 119

The Guaranty Trust Court, thus, made unnecessary Erie’s inquiries into whether
there was federal power to make law in a particular case and, if so, whether that
power was appropriately exercised by Congress or the Supreme Court in the case at
issue. It replaced those questions with an inquiry (under the “policy” of Erie) into
whether use of federal law would be outcome determinative in the particular
litigation. Although the language of the Guaranty Trust decision would have
permitted a more nuanced choice of federal or state law, 120 the Court applied its
outcome-determinative approach inflexibly, concluding regularly that federal courts
sitting in diversity were to be considered as “only another court of the State” 121 and,
Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 107-10.
117 Id. at 109-10.
118
Id. at 109.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1965).
121 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). See also Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947)); Ragan v. Merchs.
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949) (“If recovery could not be had in the state court,
it should be denied in the federal court”); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555
(1949) (noting that Erie and its progeny established a “far-reaching change in the relation of state
and federal courts and the application of state law in the latter whereby in diversity cases the federal
court administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own conduct of business”)
(citation omitted)); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947). The Supreme Court, in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956), articulated the conformity requirement as
follows:
The federal court enforces the state-created right by rules of procedure which it has
acquired from the Federal Government and which therefore are not identical with those of
the state courts. Yet, in spite of that difference in procedure, the federal court enforcing a
115
116
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thus, that differing federal procedure must yield to state law. The Court’s invocation
of the “outcome-determinative” approach to bridging the substance-procedure
divide in Erie cases focused on the desire to ensure vertical uniformity – a uniform
outcome for state-law claims, whether tried in the state or federal courts – and
caused many to doubt the validity, at least in diversity actions, of the newly created
Federal Rules that had been intended to establish uniform, simple, and predictable
procedural Rules for the federal courts. 122

Guaranty Trust, of course, did not deal with a potential conflict between Federal
Rule and state law. In this pre-Hanna era, 123 however, rigorous application of
Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative principle threatened the validity of the
nascent Federal Rules. 124 As Professor Arthur Hill wrote, “Inevitably the question
arose whether the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could stand if
they tended to promote an outcome at variance from the outcome in a state
court.” 125 The Court’s 1949 decision in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 126 cemented the grounds for concern, and, in fact, put at risk the integrity of the
Rules. 127
In Ragan, the Supreme Court seemed to subordinate Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 to state law,
by applying outcome determinative principles. 128 At issue was a potential conflict

state-created right in a diversity case is, as we have said in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, . . . in substance ‘only another court of the State.’
122 For discussion of the purposes of the original Federal Rules, see Burbank, supra note 23, at 102425; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 690 & n.67.
For an overview of the commentary despairing that Federal Rules could be effective in diversity after
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) and the companion cases of Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co., 530 U.S. 541 (1949) and Woods v. Interstate Realty, Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949), see Gavit, supra note 29, at 1, 3, 24-26; Hill, supra note 29, at 432-34 (cataloguing uncertainty
regarding the validity of federal statutes and at least the following Federal Rules in instances of
potentially inconsistent state law, following the Court’s decision in Ragan: Federal Rules 15(c)
(relation back of amended pleadings), Rule 6 (time computation principles), 25(a) (substitution of
parties), Rule 41(b) (dismissal of action for nonprosecution), Rule 13 (counterclaims and
crossclaims), Rule 18(b) (joinder of principal claim with contingent claim), Rule 2 (regarding joinder
of legal and equitable claims), Rule 23(a)(3) (“spurious” class actions), Rule 42(a) (regarding
admissibility of evidence), Rule 35 (mental and physical exams), Rules 38 and 39 (regarding denying
a jury trial when a conflicting state law would permit jury trial), Rule 17(b) (capacity of certain types
of persons to sue and be sued), Rule 23(b) (actions by shareholders), Rule 4(d) (substituted
service)); Merrigan, supra note 29, at 711-12, 717-25; Keeffe et al., supra note 29, at 506-09, 513,
525; Clark, supra note 29, at 182-84.
123 Hanna solidified the difference between the Court’s rulemaking, which is based on congressionally
delegated authority, and Court common law or practice, and it released “valid” Federal Rules, i.e.,
Rules that complied with the Constitution and the REA’s substantive rights provision, from the
gravitational pull of the RDA analysis, which applied to cases subject to the “relatively unguided Erie
choice.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 464, 471 (1965); see also Ely, supra note 15, at 697-700, 718-22.
124 See supra note 122.
125 Hill, supra, note 29, at 429.
126 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
127
See supra note 122.
128 Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949).
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between Rule 3, which provided that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court,” 129 and state law, which provided that “[a]n action shall be
deemed commenced within the meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the
date of the summons which is served on him. . . .” 130 The plaintiff had filed a
diversity action in federal court on September 4, 1945, regarding an accident that
occurred on October 1, 1943 – safely within the two-year statute of limitations
prescribed by the governing Kansas law. 131 Service on the defendant, however, was
not perfected until December 28, 1945, which was outside the two-year limitations
period and which triggered the potential conflict between Federal Rule and state
law. The Ragan Court concluded, in line with the uniformity policy of Erie, as
articulated in Guaranty Trust, that, “[i]f recovery could not be had in the state court,
it should be denied in the federal court.” 132 Emphasizing that the state claim at issue
“accrues and comes to an end when local law so declares,” the Court concluded that
the claim could not have “longer life in the federal court than it would have had in
the state court without adding something to the cause of action.” 133
In so holding, the Court gave short shrift to arguments of the plaintiff in Ragan 134
and Justice Rutledge, in a dissent that he filed with respect to each of the three Erie
cases decided on the same day as Ragan. 135 Each argued that, when Federal Rules
were at issue, the Erie line of cases did not control. 136 Justice Rutledge took the
majority to task for applying to Federal Rules Guaranty Trust’s “gloss on the Erie
rule” that had positioned the federal court in diversity as “’merely another court of
the state in which it sits,” and, which, in Justice Rutledge’s view, had “seriously
impaired Congress’s power” to control procedure in diversity litigation. 137 He
concluded that, although it is difficult to distinguish between substance and
procedure, the Court must do so either mechanically by “reference to whether the
state courts’ doors are open or closed” or by reconciling the rule of Erie with
Congress’s conceded authority over procedure in the federal courts. 138 Without

Id. at 531 & n.1.
Id. at 531 & n.4.
131 Id. at 531.
132 Id. at 532.
133 Id. at 533-34.
134 Brief of Petitioner, 1949 WL 50616, at *7-*24, *35-*40, Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (No. 522) (arguing that Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1940) and Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), provided the correct analysis for determining the
validity of Rules promulgated under the REA and that it would be improper to extend the Guaranty
Trust analysis to Federal Rules).
135 337 U.S. 541, 558-59 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (Emphasizing that the three cases – Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 530 U.S. 535
(1949), and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 530 U.S. 541 (1949) -- indicate the extent to
which the Court is inappropriately submitting control of diversity jurisdiction to the states, based on
a “gloss” on the language of Erie v. Tompkins, rather than to Congress, which “has the power to
govern the procedure of the federal courts in diversity”).
136 See supra notes 134 and 135.
137 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558-59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 559.
129
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acknowledging these arguments, the Ragan Court held that state law controlled
under Erie’s uniformity policy.

Although commentators’ reports of the death of Rule 3 turned out to be
premature, 139 it was not until much later – 1965 -- that the Hanna Court (1) would
reinterpret the Ragan case as one in which the “scope of the Federal Rule was not as
broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there [was] no Federal Rule which
covered the point in dispute;” 140 and (2) would resurrect the notion – ignored by the
Supreme Court in Ragan, but not in the federal circuit courts 141 -- that Federal Rules
and statutes were subject to different standards of validity than judge-made law. 142
In the interim, the sense that broad application of the outcome-determinative
principle would override conflicting Federal Rules (and even federal statutes),
combined with the growing arguments that outcome determination, as construed by
the Court, elevated the states above Congress in matters of federal procedure, 143 to
reduce the importance of an avoidance principle.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 144 a case decided on the same day as
Ragan, the Court used an avoidance canon that seemed to straddle the divide
between “classical” and “modern” or “serious doubts” avoidance. 145 In so-called
“serious doubts” avoidance, the court will, if possible, avoid the most natural
construction of a provision in favor of a less plausible construction, if the most
natural interpretation presents a serious question of potential invalidity. A court
using a serious doubts analysis in the REA context would construe a rule narrowly
to avoid invalidity if the most natural construction of the Rule raised serious doubts
about whether the Rule would abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights.

A majority of the Cohen Court avoided finding a direct conflict between (1) Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23, which included prerequisites for stockholder derivative actions; and (2)
a New Jersey statute, which required a plaintiff in a derivative action who had
specified minimal holdings in the defendant corporation to pay attorney fees and
expenses of the defendant if the suit were unsuccessful and also to post security for
payment of the fees and expenses. 146 The Court concluded that, because there was
no conflict in the prerequisites of Rule 23 and the New Jersey statute, the provisions

See, e.g., Hill, supra note 29, at 432 (stating that “Rule 3 (commencement of action) was struck
down by the Supreme Court itself in the Ragan case”).
140 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
141 See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963); D’Onofrio Constr.
Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1958); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.
1940).
142 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-65, 469-74.
143 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 530 U.S. 541, 558-59 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). See also Gavit, supra 29, at 26; Hill, supra note 29, at 427-34, 577-86 (recognizing that
Court opinions had endangered the Federal Rules and, indeed federal statutes, but arguing that there
is federal power to create uniform rules of procedure).
144 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
145
See supra notes 106 to 108.
146 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543-44, 555-57.
139
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of both the Federal Rule and state law could apply consistently with the policy of
Guaranty Trust. 147 The Cohen Court parsed the statute into two categories – the
clearly substantive and the possibly procedural. It concluded that the requirement
that plaintiff-stockholders with minimal corporate holdings pay fees and expenses
of the defendant corporation if the defendant prevailed created a new liability and
was clearly substantive. 148 Respecting the requirement to post security for payment
of the fees and expenses, however, the Court noted that procedural rules “do not
always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure.” 149 Emphasizing that the
security requirement made meaningful the substantive liability for fees and costs,
the Court concluded that it “[did] not think” the state requirement could be
disregarded by a federal court as “a mere procedural device.” 150 The Court then
compared the procedural prerequisites to suit set forth in Rule 23 and those in the
New Jersey statute. Finding no conflict in the provisions of Rule and statute and that
all could be observed, the Court saw “no reason why the policy stated in Guaranty
Trust . . . should not apply.” 151 Again, pre-Hanna avoidance protected the Federal
Rule (but not very much), rather than state law.

The Supreme Court did not otherwise overtly reference an avoidance principle
in pre-Hanna REA cases. That is unsurprising. As noted, avoidance, in the preHanna period, meant only that the Federal Rules would not be invalidated as a
formal matter. As a pragmatic matter, the Rules would be subordinated to state law
in cases of a direct conflict, in which outcome determination, as applied by the
courts, meant that state law would prevail, and the Rules also yielded to state law
(but were not formally invalidated) in instances in which the Court avoided a direct
conflict, since, absent a conflict with a controlling Federal Rule, the state law would
apply or both the Federal and state law would control. 152 In other pre-Hanna, REA
cases, the Federal Rule at issue also seemed to succumb to Court implementation of
an outcome-determinative analysis that appeared to override the Rules based on a
determination that the federal court must sit as “another court of the state.”153
Indeed, some commentators, emphasizing the ineffectiveness of Federal Rules in
diversity cases as opposed to federal question cases, began to suggest that the Court
make it official and promulgate a Rule indicating that Federal Rules applied in
federal question cases only. 154
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
150
Id. at 556. It is not clear whether the Court decided the issue of invalidity, as in “ classical” or “narrow”
avoidance, or whether its statement that it “[did] not think” that the statute “[could] be disregarded as . . .
“mere procedure” is in fact, an abdication of a final decision and a use of serious doubts avoidance.
151
Id.
152 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556-57 (observing that, where there was no conflict between the Federal Rule
and state law, there was no reason why the policy of Guaranty Trust, and hence, both federal and
state law, should not apply).
153
See supra note 121.
154
See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 29, at 727; Clark, supra note 29, at 183-84.
147
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In one final pre-Hanna case, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 155 the Court
used an interpretive canon of avoidance. The Bernhardt Court examined a federal
statute (rather than a Federal Rule) that was in potential conflict with state law.
Bernhardt, thus, is inapposite in the REA context because the Court did not construe
a Rule narrowly to avoid deciding the substantive-procedural limitation of the REA.
(The substantive rights limitation, of course, is not applicable to federal statutes156).
Instead, the Court used “serious doubts” avoidance to construe the federal statute at
issue narrowly to avoid deciding a serious question of constitutional law. State law,
in Bernhardt, permitted revocation of an agreement to arbitrate at any time before
an abitral award; the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), by contrast, rendered
arbitration agreements covered by the FAA “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” and
permitted stay of a trial court action pending arbitration. 157 Bernhardt’s use of a
“serious doubts” avoidance canon was significant, though not to REA avoidance.
The serious question of constitutional law that the Bernhardt Court avoided was
whether Congress had the power to require arbitration in diversity cases in the face
of contrary state law. Avoidance, thus, permitted delay – at least until the Byrd
decision two years later 158 -- of the inevitable decision regarding whether the
ultimate power over federal procedure in diversity cases lay with Congress or the
states.
The battle lines were clearly drawn, however, and avoidance in Bernhardt would
only buy time regarding the serious constitutional inquiry: whether states (under
the rationale of Erie and Guaranty Trust) or Congress (and, thus, also its delegate,
the Supreme Court) under the authority of Articles I and III and the Supremacy
Clause would prevail in event of an unavoidable conflict between state law and
federal statute or Rule. In the interim, the Bernhardt decision to avoid the clash of
state law and federal statute seemed to solidify the strength of state courts over
federal procedure and to indicate that even conflicting federal statutes would fall to
state law under the outcome-determinative approach. 159 In fact, Judge Charles Clark
reported that commentators, concluding that Federal Rules that differed from state
law could not prevail in diversity, were recommending (1) that the principle for
validity of any federal procedure (whether based on statute, Rule, or judge-made
law) be based on whether differences between state and federal procedure would
lead to “forum shopping”; (2) that the Federal Rules be amended to provide that
they only applied in federal question cases; 160 or (3) that courts “merely hope” for a

350 U.S. 198 (1956).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). See also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470
(7th Cir. 1984); accord Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note
10, at 748.
157 Id. at 199-201.
158 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
159
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 29, at 431-32, 437.
160
See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 29, at 727 (recommending that the Federal Rules be repealed as to
diversity cases (but not federal question cases) and that federal court conformity to state procedure be
reinstituted by Court Rule or by statute); Gavit, supra note 29, at 26 (stating that the Federal Rules should
be amended to state the Court’s intent or to state that in “all diversity cases the Rules are not applicable” or
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reversal in policy from the Supreme Court in “an inevitable reaction from the
present low point.” 161
C. The Avoidance Canon in Post-Hanna Cases

Section II.C focuses on the Supreme Court’s use of avoidance techniques in postHanna cases, broadening the exploration beyond use of avoidance in REA cases
under Erie to include avoidance in the context of apparent clashes of congressional
statutes and Federal Rules and to include avoidance in general construction of
Federal Rules. Section III.C.1 resumes the narrative of the evolution of the Erie
doctrine and its impact on an avoidance canon in the REA analysis in Erie cases.
Specifically, Section II.C.1 discusses the Supreme Court’s limiting of Guaranty Trust’s
outcome-determinative approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. and Hanna v. Plumer and the consequent increase in importance of the scope of
a Federal Rule in apparent conflict with state law.

Section II.C.2.a discusses the post-Hanna, Erie REA cases in which the Court
complied with the substantive-procedural divide by construing Rules narrowly and
not to conflict with state law, thus making unnecessary a validity analysis under the
REA: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., and Semtek
International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. This discussion reveals that the postHanna cases lack a consistent approach – other than that avoidance is based on
federalism concerns. 162 It also demonstrates that avoidance based on federalism
concerns leads, like the Guaranty Trust outcome-determinative principle, to
differing definitions of Federal Rules in diversity and federal question cases. Section
II.C.2.b concludes the historical retrospective with an examination of the Court’s use
of avoidance in other REA contexts, noting Congress’s move to reclaim a role in
federal procedural rulemaking in the 1970s and 1980s, which, in turn, reprised the
importance of the substantive rights limitation in potential conflicts between
congressional statutes and Federal Rules and in construction of Federal Rules. In
these contexts, the Court has, in opting for avoidance, relied much more heavily on
the text of the Rule, its historical context, and the Advisory Committee Notes than
the Court has done in its use of avoidance in Erie cases. The Court also generally
used “serious doubts” avoidance to construe Rules narrowly to avoid a direct
validity analysis.
1. From Byrd to Hanna – the Elevation of the Importance of Scope

Two years after its decision in Bernhardt delaying confrontation regarding
congressional and state power over procedure in federal courts, the Supreme Court
the Court should state that “the Supreme Court which promulgated the Federal Rules . . ., having power to
do so, decided the matter in controversy”).
161
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 29, at 183-84.
162
See infra notes 186-220, and accompanying text.
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decided Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 163 which began the
process of making federal procedure relevant again in diversity cases. Rejecting the
notion that outcome determination was the only consideration when federal and
state procedural laws clashed, Byrd introduced a form of interest balancing that
permitted consideration of “affirmative countervailing” federal interests and state
interests as well as the likelihood that applying federal law would be outcome
determinative. 164 No longer would federal courts sitting in diversity be viewed as
“just another court of the state,” whose procedure must yield to conflicting state
procedure or be construed narrowly not to apply. To the contrary, sometimes, in
instances of conflict, federal procedural law would control. In this legal landscape, a
narrow construction of the scope of the Federal Rule at issue could be
consequential, and, after Hanna, would be dispositive.

The Supreme Court’s decision seven years later, in Hanna v. Plumer, 165
completed the Supreme Court’s “inevitable reaction” to rigid application of the
outcome-determinative principle that Judge Charles Clark had hoped for. 166 Hanna
limited even further the application of Erie’s uniformity policy, as articulated in
Guaranty Trust; 167 acknowledged congressional superiority in federal procedural
law enacted in compliance with Congress’s broad authority over federal courts
under Articles I and III of the Constitution as supplemented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause; 168 and vastly empowered Federal Rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court when in conflict with state law. After Hanna, Federal Rules that
conflicted with state law would be valid and would control if they neither violated
the Constitution, nor exceeded the statutory limitations of the Rules Enabling Act.169
A Federal Rule passed constitutional muster if the Rule, “though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, [was] rationally capable of
classification as either.” 170 It complied with the substantive rights limitation of the
Rules Enabling Act if it “’really regulate[d] procedure -- the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law, and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.’” 171 As
Justice Scalia emphasized in his plurality opinion in Shady Grove, under this
standard, the Supreme Court has rejected every challenge asserting that a Federal
Rule failed to comply with the substantive rights limitation. 172 It is not clear,
however, if this is a virtue or a vestige of the Supreme Court’s willingness to

356 U.S. 525 (1958)
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535-50.
165 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
166
See supra note 161, and accompanying text.
167 380 U.S. at 467-68.
168 Id. at 471-72.
169 Id. at 463-64, 471.
170 Id. at 472; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27-28, 31-32 (1988); Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 & n.3 (1987).
171 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
172 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43 (2010)(opinion
of the Court).
163
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construe Rules narrowly to safeguard “important state interests.” 173 Indeed, Justice
Stevens and a growing number of commentators have concluded that the Court
must, on occasion, be willing to find a conflict between Federal Rule and state law, to
reach the validity analysis, and, on occasion, to invalidate a Rule. 174 What is
certainly clear is that, after Hanna, the scope of the Federal Rule became critical.

Hanna also taught the first lessons of instrumental interpretation of the scope of
Federal Rules in potential conflict with state law, by providing only a cursory
analysis of the scope issue regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); by referencing, as
governed by avoidance principles, prior cases in which the Federal Rule had seemed
to fall to state law under an outcome-determinative analysis; and by suggesting that
avoidance would be governed by federalism concerns. In determining the scope of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), which was at issue in Hanna, the Court did not use a canon of
narrow construction or avoidance, but simply stated in a conclusory manner that
the “clash is unavoidable,” 175 and it also concluded that Rule 4(d)(1) complied with
both the constitutional and Enabling Act requirements, noting that Rules adopted
through the Enabling Act process carried a presumption of validity. 176 Rule 4(d)(1)
permitted service of process by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a
defendant’s residence with “a person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein . . . ,” while the Massachusetts statute at issue provided for service to be
made “by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator” before the
expiration of the statutorily specified one-year period. 177 In determining that Rule
4(d)(1) was valid, however, the Court ignored a potential substantive rights issue
similar to that in Ragan – whether the method of substitute service under the Rule
4(d)(1) interfered impermissibly with the state’s choice to limit an executor’s
exposure to liability through the notice provision. 178
Second, in its harmonization of prior decisions in which Federal Rules had been
in potential conflict with state law, the Hanna Court hastened to assure that no
Federal Rule had ever been invalidated by the outcome-determination principle of
173

Id. at 1448 & n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1451-52, 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Doernberg,
supra note 2, at ___; Burbank & Wolff, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.58, at 51; Dudley &
Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 743.
175 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
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Id. at 462-63, 471-74 & n.1. The Hanna Court discussed the standards for a Rule’s validity under the
Constitution and the substantive rights limitation of the REA, id. at 463-65, 471-74, and it also prescribed a
presumption of Rule validity under the REA, indicating that “[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the
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omitted).
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Id. at 461-62.
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McCoid, supra note 39, at 913-14.
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the RDA analysis. 179 The Court instructed, instead, that in each case of apparent
Federal Rule-state law conflict in which state law had prevailed, the Court had
determined that the scope of the Federal Rule was not broad enough to cover the
issue. 180 In support of the position, the Hanna Court appropriately discussed Palmer
v. Hoffman, 181 in which the Court construed Rule 8(c) narrowly and avoided Rule
nullification in the context of the Court’s additional conclusion that burden of proof
was substantive, and appropriately referenced Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 182 in which the Court had narrowly interpreted the scope of the Rule 23(b)
(now, Rule 23.1) and, thus, avoided the state-law’s invalidation of the Rule (although
the court concluded that both state law and Federal Rule provisions would govern
under principles of Guaranty Trust).
The Hanna Court’s additional reference to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co, as a case decided on avoidance principles, 183 however, seemed, at
best, strained and, at worst, disingenuous, because the case had previously been
widely construed as requiring Rule 3 to yield under outcome-determinative
principles. 184 With the Hanna Court’s new take on the case as one decided under
avoidance principles, it was possible to read Ragan as a case in which the Court
elided an initial determination that the Federal Rule and state law did not conflict
and addressed the dispositive issue of whether federal or state law would control
absent a Federal Rule on point. Imposing such a construction on competing federal
and state provisions that both seemed to speak directly to when a case should be
179
180

Id.

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
Id. The Hanna Court stated as follows:
The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that there have been
cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the
situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each case was not
that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather
that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore,
there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the
enforcement of state law.

318 U.S. 109 (1943). See also supra notes 99-113, and accompanying text.
337 U.S. 541 (1949); see also supra notes 144- 151, and accompanying text.
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Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12 (citing Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1959). The
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Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
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cases, Federal Rules had not been in conflict with state law, the Iovino court determined that Rule 3 dealt
only with commencement of an action and not with tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 47-48.
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See, e.g., Gavit, supra note 29, at 3, 6-8 (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision, but indicating that it
was incorrect); Hill, supra note 29, at 432; Merrigan, supra note 29, at 718-20; but see Iovino, 274 F.2d at
47-48.
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deemed “commenced,” however, suggested either that Hanna had, in fact, overruled
Ragan, or that courts could construe a Federal Rule against the plain import of its
text to conclude that the scope of the Federal Rule was not broad enough to control
the point in issue when the Rule might otherwise conflict with state law. 185 Despite
Hanna’s seemingly mechanical standard that would uniformly protect Federal Rules,
the Court has chosen the latter option in its post-Hanna avoidance jurisprudence,
and construed Rules narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law, with the results that
Federal Rules may be inappropriately subordinated to state law and that Federal
Rules do not apply uniformly, but take on different meanings in diversity and
federal question cases.
2. Avoidance in Post-Hanna Cases

a. Avoidance in Post-Hanna, Erie Cases

The Supreme Court’s post-Hanna REA cases under Erie have generally premised
avoidance, when it is used, on the federalism goals of avoiding interference with
important state interests or important state regulatory policies, 186 but otherwise
reveal a continuing search for an appropriate avoidance principle. The cases exhibit
little consistency in approach to avoidance, in defining when state interests or
policies would qualify as important, and little consistent reliance on Rule text, Rule
history, or Advisory Committee Notes to limit permissible “saving” constructions.
This avoidance, based on an unbounded concept of important state interests and
regulatory policies, has led to differing interpretations of Federal Rules in diversity
and federal question cases.
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 187 the Supreme Court revisited the issue it
addressed in Ragan – whether Rule 3 or state law controls the commencement of an
action for purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations. 188 Rule 3 and state law
seemed to be in “direct conflict,” and the appellate court so stated, although it felt
“constrained” to follow Ragan. 189 The Supreme Court also construed Federal Rule 3
185

The Hanna Court referenced the Bernhardt case with a “cf” citation. Bernhardt, in which the Court
had construed a statute, the Federal Arbitration Act, narrowly to avoid serious constitutional doubts
is doctrinally inapplicable to construing a Federal Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict abridging,
enlarging, or modifying substantive rights, and the Court seems to acknowledge the distinction. The
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contravention of the substantive rights limitation of the REA.
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Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 & n.7, 436-37 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
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187 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
188 Id. at 742-43. As in Ragan, the state statute in Walker provided that an action would be deemed
commenced when the defendant was served, and Rule 3 provided for commencement when the
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not to conflict with the state statute, relying, in part, on stare decisis and the need to
reconsider both Hanna and Ragan if it were to conclude that Rule 3 and state statute
The Walker Court additionally cautioned against a narrow
conflicted. 190
construction of a Federal Rule to avert a conflict between Federal Rule and state law
when contrary to a plain textual reading of the Rule at issue. 191 Having so advised,
however, the Court construed Rule 3 narrowly and against a plain reading of its text
and, perhaps, history 192 -- an impermissible result under the analogous canon to
construe ambiguous statutes to avoid an unconstitutional construction. 193

Construing a Federal Rule against its text and doing so to protect state law,
rather than separation of powers interests, creates potential for inconsistencies
when the same Rule is construed in federal question cases. This potential for
inconsistency played out in the nondiversity case, West v. Conrail, 194 in which the
Supreme Court construed Rule 3 differently than in Walker, holding that a complaint
is timely filed if it is filed, in accord with Rule 3, before the applicable statute of
limitations runs. 195 The Court expressly declined to borrow the statute of
limitations provisions for service of process 196 and expressly noted that its
construction of Rule 3 meant that Rule 3 would be construed differently in diversity
and federal question cases, a methodology that commentators have disparaged as
effectively giving “two plain meanings” to a Rule 3. 197 More fundamentally, Court
reliance on state interests to guide avoidance when state law is in potential conflict
with Federal Rules but on “substantive rights” when federal law is in potential
conflict with Federal Rules, creates two standards for Rule validity under the REA.
When combined with a willingness to construe Rules contrary to their text and
history, moreover, the door is open again to “Erie unlimited.” 198
190
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In its next REA case, the Court did not rely on avoidance, but construed the
Federal Rule broadly to cover the point in dispute. In Burlington Northern Railroad
Co. v. Woods, 199the Court considered an apparent conflict between Fed. R. App. P. 38
and an Alabama statute that imposed a mandatory ten percent affirmance penalty
when a money judgment was affirmed on appeal without substantial
modification. 200 Rule 38, by contrast, provided that “[i]f the court of appeals shall
determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee.” 201 The Burlington Northern Court noted the purposes
of Alabama’s mandatory affirmance penalty were to penalize frivolous appeals and
to provide additional damages for having to undergo appeal, 202 and the purpose of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 was to permit “damages . . . by the court in its discretion in the case
of a frivolous appeal as a matter of justice to the appellee and as a penalty against
the appellant.” 203 The Court, first, provided a broader definition of the scope of a
Federal Rule, indicating that a Federal Rule conflicts with state law if it is
“’sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly to
‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of
state law.” 204 Under this standard, the discretion permitted by Rule 38 conflicted
unmistakably with the mandatory nature of the state statute, and the purposes of
the federal and state provisions were “sufficiently coextensive” to establish that the
Federal Rule “occupie[d] the [state] statute’s field of operation so as to preclude its
application.” 205 The Burlington Northern Court reached out to find a conflict where
none was necessary since Rule 38 is, by its terms, limited to penalizing frivolous
appeals and the Alabama statute at issue encompassed nonmeritorious as well as
frivolous appeals. It also did so in the face of a substantive purpose of state law to
augment available damages when a holder of a money judgment survived appeal
with the judgment substantially intact. The case seemed to indicate that the
Supreme Court was abandoning both avoidance as a principle of Rule interpretation
and its prior protection of state interests.
Any such intent was short-lived, as the Court, in Gasperini, changed course yet
again and endorsed a broad avoidance principle – an “accommodation” approach, in
which the Court balanced and attempted to accommodate the interests underlying
199
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the potentially conflicting federal and state standards. 206 The Court eschewed the
Hanna methodology of beginning with an inquiry into the scope of the potentially
conflicting Federal Rule. The Gaspirini Court, instead, concluded that the New York
statute at issue, CPLR § 5501(c), 207 was both substantive and procedural, 208 and it
emphasized that the “dispositive question” was “[w]hether federal courts can give
effect to the substantive thrust of CPLR § 5501(c) without untoward alteration of
the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases.” 209 In pursuit of the goal
of accommodation, the Gaspirini Court weighed the substantive and, thus, dominant
state interest and federal interests and determined that both interests could be
served by providing trial court review, rather than appellate review of the
verdict. 210 The standard Hanna scope analysis was relegated to a footnote, was
addressed much later in the opinion, and consisted primarily of statements that
Rule 59(a) was inapplicable and that the Court interprets Federal Rules to avoid
conflict with important state regulatory policies. 211 Gaspirini’s avoidance by
accommodation hinged much less on adopting a plausible, though narrowed,
construction of the text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) than on the goal of limiting
application of Rule 59(a), if important state and federal interests could both be
served.
Finally, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 212 a unanimous
Supreme Court likewise employed a broad avoidance principle, but this time one
that paralleled modern statutory construction to avoid serious constitutional
doubts, and it based avoidance on, among other factors, both separation of powers
and federalism concerns. The Semtek Court construed Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) narrowly
(but against its accepted meaning) to avoid conflict with California preclusion law
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that would have permitted a case to proceed. 213 Rule 41(b) provided that certain
dismissals would operate as an “adjudication upon the merits,” 214 and it, thus,
seemed to define certain judgments that would be eligible for claim preclusive
effect. To avoid an interpretation of Rule 41(b) that conflicted with California’s
more lenient law and that was, thus, arguably in violation of the substantive rights
limitation and “the federalism principle of Erie,” the Court contorted the meaning of
“adjudication upon the merits,” determining that it meant only that a litigant could
not refile the suit in the same district court. 215 Commentators have referred to this
limiting construction as “transparently dubious,” 216 “remarkably strained,” 217 and
“wildly implausible.” 218 The Semtek Court, thus, returned to a “serious doubts”
avoidance analysis and appropriately based avoidance on the Rule’s potential
violation of substantive rights (but also on federalism interests). The saving
construction adopted by the Semtek Court, however, was contrary to the plain
meaning of the text, the Rule’s history as revealed in Advisory Committee Notes and
information, and prior construction of Rule 41(b), 219 an impermissible result under
“serious doubts” avoidance principles. 220

In summary, avoidance in the post-Hanna, Erie cases has emerged as a malleable
surrogate for meaningful guidance regarding the substantive rights limitation. The
avoidance cases demonstrate little consistency, save for a consistent focus on
avoidance to protect state interests, which has permitted differing interpretations of
Federal Rules in diversity and federal question cases. This focus has permitted too
much emphasis on unbounded “state interests” and too little on whether the Federal
Rule impermissibly impacts substantive rights. The Court has also repeatedly
changed its methodology for avoidance, thus demonstrating continuing
dissatisfaction with its avoidance analysis and also contrasting with the Court’s
fairly consistent use of a serious doubts analysis, bounded by Rule text and history,
in its admittedly few non-Erie, REA cases discussed in the next Section.
213
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While the Court has struggled with the scope of Federal Rules in Federal Rulestate law conflicts, the Court has also examined the issue of Rule scope in other
contexts, including congressional statute-Federal Rule conflicts and in general Rule
interpretation. 221 Though the Court has taken fewer opportunities to address
avoidance in non-Erie, REA cases, 222 it has used a serious doubts model of avoidance
and relied more heavily on text and history of the Rule, as described in Advisory
Committee Notes, as a limit on plausible Rule interpretation.

In resolving apparent congressional statute-Federal Rule conflicts, courts have
sometimes treated Federal Rules as though they were statutes and as though the
Court’s prospective rulemaking authority was equivalent to Congress’s lawmaking
authority. 223 This is contrary to the Court’s attitude in Erie REA cases in which the
Court has often subordinated Federal Rules to state law. This attitude may be
attributed, in part, to the period of nearly forty years following the enactment of the
REA, in which Congress generally declined to enact legislation that included
procedural provisions or to enact amendments to the Federal Rules. 224 Ultimately,
following the 1973 skirmish over promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 225
Congress, concerned that the proposed evidence rules overstepped the substantive
rights limitation, became more active in the rulemaking process and more vigilant
regarding potential rulemaking infractions of the substantive rights limitation. This
meant that the substantive rights limitation would not be construed solely in Erie
cases featuring Federal Rules and state law. The Supreme Court would also ignore
the substantive rights limitation to the detriment of its rulemaking authority, as
some commentators believed happened in the Marek v. Chesny case, 226 which, in
part, triggered Congress’s unsuccessful attempt to subordinate Court rulemaking to
congressional statutes by repealing a portion of the REA. 227

The Court’s 1984 decision in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 228 appears to be
the first congressional statute-Federal Rule case in which a justice counseled
narrow construction of a Federal Rule to avoid potential violation of the substantive
rights proviso (although the Court had been using an avoidance canon
intermittently in Erie cases since 1943 229). In Daily Income Fund, the Court
considered whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 imposed a demand requirement before a
221
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shareholder could initiate a derivative action against a mutual fund under § 36(b) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA). The majority in Daily Income Fund
concluded, without reaching the REA issue, that a § 36(b) action was not a
“derivative action” because it could not be enforced by a mutual fund. 230 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens used a serious doubts analysis to read Rule 23.1
narrowly and not to impose a demand requirement in any scenario, in order to
avoid impacting substantive rights in violation of the REA. 231 Justice Stevens
conceded that a shareholder demand requirement in a derivative suit enhances the
role of managerial prerogatives and expertise, is designed to improve corporate
governance, and is substantive. 232 He emphasized, however, that “the history of
Rule 23.1 and its predecessors demonstrates” that the demand requirement was
created by federal common law in Hawes v. City of Oakland, 233 and not in Rule
23.1. 234 Moreover, Rule 23.1, by its plain text, did not impose a demand
requirement, but imposed only a pleading requirement – that the complaint allege
with particularity the demand, if any, that the complainant had made on the
corporation. 235 The Rule, thus, enabled a court to ascertain from the pleadings
whether an otherwise applicable demand requirement had been satisfied. 236 In
language similar to the canon to construe against serious constitutional doubts,
Justice Stevens determined that there is a “substantial doubt whether [Rule 23.1]
could create . . . [a demand] requirement consistently with the Rules Enabling
Act,” 237 and, thus, “[s]ince the rule does not clearly create such a substantive
requirement by its express terms, it should not be lightly construed to do so and
thereby alter substantive rights.” 238 The Supreme Court returned to the issue of
whether Rule 23.1 should be construed narrowly and not to impose a demand
requirement in the 1991 case of Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 239 and
adopted the narrow construction of Rule 23.1 suggested by Justice Stevens in Daily
Income Fund. 240
230
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The year after the Court decided Daily Income Fund, however, a majority of the
Court, in Marek v. Chesny, 241 declined even to address the issue of whether a
construction of Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 would violate the substantive rights limitation. At
issue was whether a prevailing plaintiff’s right to attorney fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Act, in which attorneys fees are defined to be part of “costs,”242
would be subject to shifting of “costs” under Rule 68, 243 and, further, according to
Justice Brennan in dissent, whether such a construction of Rule 68 would violate the
substantive rights limitation of the REA. Disregarding the issue of impermissible
impact on substantive rights, the Marek majority used a “plain meaning”
construction of the intersection of Rule 68 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to conclude that the
two provisions could be harmonized: Rule 68 provided for shifting of “costs”
incurred after a plaintiff failed to accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment and later
received less than the offer at trial, and § 1988 defined “costs” for purposes of the
Civil Rights Attorney Fee Act to include “attorney fees.” 244 Hence, the Court held
that, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, attorney fees
in civil rights actions were “costs” that could be forfeited under Rule 68. 245 Justice
Brennan forcefully asserted in dissent that the majority’s interpretation of Rule 68
violated the substantive rights provision of the REA because it permitted a little
known Federal Rule regarding “cost” shifting to override Congress’s policy decision
that prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 civil rights actions should normally receive
attorney fees. 246 He advised as well a “serious doubts” type of avoidance,
emphasizing that Federal Rules “have sometimes been interpreted or their domain of
application narrowed to avoid abridging substantive rights,” citing, inter alia, Erie REA
cases, and concluding that the term “costs” in Rule 68 should have been narrowly
construed to avoid an interpretation that would abridge the right to attorney fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. 247
The Marek decision sparked congressional concern that the Court was exceeding its
prospective lawmaking authority under the REA and, in part, precipitated the House of
Representative’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to amend the REA so that conflicting
Federal Rules would not supersede a congressional statute. 248 Marek underscores, in the
congressional statute-Federal Rule context, the real risk to Rule interpretation when
241
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courts rely on text unaided by the touchstone of history and purpose. Indeed, Professor
Bone has characterized Marek v. Chesny as “perhaps the most notorious example of the
hazards created by an oversimplified interpretive approach.” 249 He also concluded that
the presumption of validity that Hanna extends to Federal Rules 250 should extend only to
Rule interpretations that “further the Rule’s actual purpose in some sufficiently direct
way” since the presumption is premised on the Rule’s having been vetted through the
Enabling Act process. 251
Finally, the Court has also used a serious doubts avoidance methodology in a
prominent class action case, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., and it also relied on Rule text
and history in accepting a narrowed interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 252 In Ortiz v.
Fibreboard, the Supreme Court adopted a limiting construction of the limited fund
class action available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) to avoid violating the REA’s
requirement that Rules not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights and to
stay close to the historical basis for the limited class. 253 The Ortiz Court rejected a
proposed broad mandatory settlement class rationale, concluding that although the
text of the Rule could accommodate the proposed “adventurous” 254 application of
the limited fund class, the Advisory Committee Notes showed that Rule 23(b)(1)
was drafted in a “consciously retrospective” manner with an “intent to codify preRule categories.” 255 Further, the Court concluded that the substantive rights proviso
of the REA also encouraged a cautious and narrower construction of the limited
fund class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), noting that the broader construction of
the Rule would set up a potential conflict between the pro rata distribution of
available funds proposed in a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action and the right to
complete recovery in personal injury actions under state law. 256 The Court
emphasized that, even if some tension between a Federal Rule and state law is
249
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permissible, it is best to keep it within tolerable limits by narrowing the limited fund
action available under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to practice preceding adoption. 257 The
Court, thus, applied a “serious doubts” avoidance methodology to adopt a limiting
construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and it limited the Rule’s coverage to its “historical
antecedents” and Advisory Committee expressions of understanding regarding the
scope of limited fund class actions. 258

Thus, in its few non-Erie cases, the Court used a serious doubts method of
avoidance to stay within the substantive rights limitation of the REA, and it
calibrated its limiting interpretations to plausible interpretations based on the
Rule’s text, history, and purposes as discussed in relevant Advisory Committee
Notes. In Marek v. Chesny, the Court failed to do so, but at the price of heightened
congressional concern that the Court was overstepping the substantive rights
boundary. 259 In Shady Grove, the justices engage, once again, the important issues of
appropriate methodology and guiding principles for avoidance in REA cases. They
reference and adopt varying elements of the Court’s historical use of avoidance, to
propose three different methods for avoidance that span a range of providing a very
narrow to an extremely broad scope for avoidance in REA issues.
III. THE SHADY GROVE DEBATE REGARDING APPROPRIATE USE OF AVOIDANCE IN REA CASES

The fractured opinions in Shady Grove reveal wide-ranging differences on the Court
regarding both the interpretation of the substantive rights proviso of the REA 260 and
the nature and extent of an appropriate avoidance canon of Rule interpretation in
REA cases. Section II revealed that the Supreme Court has, since its first use of an
avoidance canon in REA cases in Palmer v. Hoffman, 261 vacillated regarding whether
it would even use an avoidance canon in interpreting compliance with the
substantive rights limitation of the REA, concluding at times that avoidance was
appropriate and at other times that it would construe Rules broadly and find a
conflict when no conflict seemed necessary. 262 The Court has also used differing
avoidance methodologies.
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
Shady Grove exhibit the Court’s continuing ambivalence regarding the appropriate
model for avoidance, with Justice Scalia, for the majority, presenting a type of
257
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classical avoidance; Justice Stevens joining that portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion,
but also proposing a version of a serious doubts canon of avoidance; and Justice
Ginsburg preferring a theory of avoidance by accommodation.

The Shady Grove case involved a potential conflict between language in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b), which provides that “a class action may be maintained” if the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are met, and New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules (CPLR) § 901(b), which forbids maintenance of a class action for a statutorily
prescribed penalty or minimum payment, unless the authorizing statute expressly
permits a class action. 263 In the underlying case, Shady Grove had provided medical
care to a patient and had taken, as partial payment, an assignment of insurance
benefits issued to the patient in New York by Allstate Insurance Co. 264 When Shady
Grove sought payment for the assigned benefits, Allstate paid but failed to do so
within the 30-day period in which New York required either payment or denial of a
claim, and Allstate later refused to pay the statutorily required interest. 265 Shady
Grove thereafter filed a class action suit against Allstate in the Eastern District of
New York based on diversity jurisdiction to recover unpaid interest on its own claim
and on claims of all others that Allstate had allegedly failed to pay timely. 266 Allstate
countered that CPLR § 901(b) prevented the proposed class action because it
precludes a class action for a penalty or minimum recovery unless the statute
creating the penalty or minimum statutory damages specifically permits a class
action suit. Section 901(b) provides as follows:
Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action
to recover a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute may not be maintained as a class action. 267

Allstate also argued that, absent the ability to collect other claims for unpaid
interest in a class action, Shady Grove, which incurred approximately $500 in
unpaid interest, could not meet the amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction. 268 These facts set up the potential conflict between CPLR § 901(b) and
Rule 23(b), which provides, in part, that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule
23(a) is satisfied and if” the proposed class action is within one of the categories of
permissible class actions set forth in Rule 23(b). 269 The District Court held that Rule
23(b) and CPLR § 901(b) did not conflict and that CPLR § 901(b) precluded class
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action treatment of the claim at issue. 270 It, therefore, dismissed the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 271 The Second Circuit affirmed. 272

In a decision that featured fractured opinions and disparate reasoning, the
Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that Rule 23(b) and CPLR §
901(b) conflicted, that is, Rule 23(b) is broad enough to cover the issue in
dispute. 273 Five justices also concluded that Rule 23(b) is valid and, thus, preempts
state law, but they differed on the rationale for validity. Justices Scalia wrote a
plurality opinion that was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Sotomayor,
which concluded that Rule 23(b) was valid because the standard for validity is
whether the Rule “really regulates procedure – the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them,” 274 and Rule 23(b) satisfied that
standard. Justice Stevens concurred in the decision that Rule 23(b) was valid, but he
would read the substantive rights limitation to preclude Federal Rules that “would
displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so
intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
state-created right.” 275 Concluding that CPLR § 901(b) was procedural and not
sufficiently intertwined with substantive purposes, Justice Stevens concluded that
Rule 23 governed. 276 Justice Ginsburg dissented. Writing for four dissenting
justices, she determined that Rule 23(b) did not conflict with § 901(b) and would
have applied an Erie analysis. 277
In this Section, I examine the divergent methods for analyzing the scope of a
Federal Rule in potential conflict with state law that are presented in the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove. I conclude that an avoidance
principle is warranted in REA cases, and it should be based on analogy to construing
statutes narrowly to avoid serious constitutional doubts, in a manner similar to the
avoidance principles proffered by Justice Stevens in Shady Grove. Such an avoidance
270
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rule of interpretation, however, should be guided by whether a Rule would encroach
on Congress’s substantive lawmaking powers, rather than on whether a Rule might
interfere with an unlimited concept of important state interests or regulatory
policies. 278 Further, in determining whether avoidance is permissible, the Court
should, in line with its use of avoidance in other Enabling Act contexts, 279 construe a
Rule in accord with the Rule’s text, history, and purposes, as set forth in the
Advisory Committee Notes. 280
A. Avoidance by Analogy to the Canon to Construe Statutes to Avoid an
Unconstitutional Interpretation
1. Justice Scalia, in Dicta, Endorses a Type of Classical Avoidance

In the portion of his opinion that attracted five justices, 281 Justice Scalia
reiterated the two-part framework for resolving REA issues that has been standard
since Hanna v. Plumer 282 and also discussed in dicta an avoidance canon for Federal
Rule-state law conflicts. The REA framework, he noted, entails a twofold inquiry.
First, one must ask whether the disputed point falls within the scope of the Federal
278
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Rule, 283 or as Justice Scalia stated in Shady Grove, in perhaps a broader formulation
of the scope inquiry, whether the Rule and arguably conflicting state law “answer[]
the same question.” 284 If the answer to that question is affirmative, then, in contrast
to the “relatively unguided Erie choice” under the RDA, one must inquire whether
the Rule is within Congress’s constitutional rulemaking authority and within the
limits of rulemaking authority delegated to the Supreme Court in the REA. 285

With respect to the initial inquiry regarding whether a Federal Rule and state
law conflict, Justice Scalia, in dicta, endorsed a type of classical avoidance canon –
avoidance that is triggered if a Rule is susceptible of two meanings, one that would
violate the substantive rights proviso and one that would not. 286
This
recharacterizes slightly, but significantly, the avoidance analysis Justice Scalia has
used in previous opinions. 287 Of equal importance, Justice Scalia’s analysis of the
scope of Rule 23(b) in Shady Grove differs from his avoidance analysis in prior
opinions in that he no longer appears willing to find the Federal Rule ambiguous or
susceptible of two meanings and thus to permit a limiting construction. 288
Justice Scalia has long recognized avoidance as a legitimate principle of statutory
or Rule interpretation in Erie cases, 289 but his prior opinions turned at least in part
on avoidance to prevent substantial disuniformity of outcome in state and federal
courts, i.e., on federalism interests. 290 Thus, his formulation of avoidance was
perhaps in need of recalibration, but not of the significant dismantling it seems to
undergo in Shady Grove.
In his dissenting opinion in the 1987 case Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 291 Justice Scalia outlined an avoidance canon for congressional statutes in
potential conflict with state law that is substantially similar to “classical” avoidance,
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which counsels construing a statute narrowly, if its most natural construction would
be invalid. 292 He based avoidance on federalism interests, 293 however, rather than
on the separation of powers principles that underlie the substantive rights
limitation of the REA. This is unsurprising since Stewart involved a federal statute
in potential conflict with state law, rather than a Federal Rule-state law conflict.
Federal statutes, of course, are not subject to the REA proviso prohibiting abridging,
enlarging, or modifying substantive rights. 294 Where Justice Scalia was perhaps
analytically imprecise in Stewart was that, after formulating an avoidance canon
regarding the federal statute at issue, he included Federal Rules, in dicta, as subject
to the same avoidance principle.

In Stewart, the majority held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 295 regarding transfer of
suits among federal district courts, controlled the effect to be given to the parties’
contractual choice of forum agreement. 296 In dissent, Justice Scalia would have
found § 1404(a), at best, ambiguous, 297 and, thus, would have construed § 1404(a)
narrowly. Justice Scalia urged that “[i]n deciding whether a federal procedural
statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad reading that
would create significant disuniformity between state and federal courts should be
avoided if the text permits.” 298 He explained that, since Erie, when a Federal Rule or
statute is not on point (that is, in making an “unguided Erie choice” under the RDA
analysis), courts have strived for substantially uniform outcomes in cases that are in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. 299 That statement is unremarkable, at
least with respect to Federal Rules. Justice Scalia concluded also that the impulse
toward substantially uniform outcomes in federal and state courts derives from the
constitutional and congressional plan for diversity jurisdiction. 300 In language
quoted in all three Shady Grove opinions, 301 Justice Scalia advised that the Court
“should assume . . . when it is fair to do so, that Congress is just as concerned as we
have been to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in
292
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adjudicating claims.” 302 This may generally be an appropriate presumption with
respect to congressional statutes, 303 a subject that is beyond the scope of this
Article. Justice Scalia’s inclusion, in dicta, of Federal Rules in his avoidance
approach, however, was incomplete, since the substantive rights limitation of the
REA provides the measure of Federal Rules.

Justice Scalia next addressed avoidance in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp. 304 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia used a type of serious
doubts avoidance to construe Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) narrowly and, many have
suggested, contrary to any plausible textual or historical construction of the Rule.
Justice Scalia linked avoidance both to avoiding arguable violation of the substantive
rights limitation of the REA, 305 and to avoiding “violating the federalism principle of
Erie.” 306 Federalism interests still played a role, and perhaps a substantial role, in
Justice Scalia’s view of avoidance, although Justice Scalia started to realign
avoidance to include separation of powers concerns. Of course, as indicated earlier,
the Semtek case represented an instance in which no avoidance canon, regardless of
underlying premise, should have been available because the Rule was not capable of
the narrowing construction adopted, consistent with text and history. 307 Thus, the
Court should have reached the issue of Rule validity.

In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia restated and narrowed any available avoidance
principle, and he rejected “important state interests” and “state regulatory policies”
as the guiding principle for avoidance. After determining that the Rule and state law
were in conflict, Justice Scalia articulated an avoidance principle, in dicta, in Shady
Grove, as follows: “If the Rule [is] susceptible of two meanings – one that would
violate § 2072(b) and another that would not” – then the Rule at issue should be
construed narrowly. 308 In this restated avoidance principle, Justice Scalia corrected
his prior use of avoidance in REA cases, 309 which had focused in whole or in part on
avoiding disuniformity of outcomes in federal and state courts. 310
Justice Scalia’s new formulation, however, limits the availability of an avoidance
canon of Rule interpretation in several significant ways. First, he reverted to
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“classical” or “narrow” avoidance, no longer espousing avoidance based on serious
doubts regarding Rule validity, but indicating, instead, that he would choose a
limiting construction of an ambiguous Rule only if the Rule were susceptible of two
constructions, one of which would violate the substantive rights limitation and the
other of which would not. Second, Justice Scalia no longer construes Rules in terms
of “limiting” or “reasonable” constructions 311 or “broad” 312 and “narrow”
construction, but in terms of “artificial narrowing.” 313 Thus, Justice Scalia is not
willing to find ambiguity in Rule 23(b), but construes the Rule, instead, in
categorical terms based on its text, thus reminding that interpretive philosophy will
directly impact the availability of avoidance. Third, the combination of Justice
Scalia’s narrow definition of avoidance with his proposed broad standard for Rule
validity means that avoidance will not be available in practice: A “classical” or
narrow requirement that a Rule must be found to violate the substantive rights
limitation to permit avoidance, combined with a “really regulates procedure”
standard that admits of little if any possibility of Rule invalidity means that
avoidance will be available in principle only. Such an approach presents the very
real possibility of underprotecting the separation of powers boundary that Congress
included in the REA and, correspondingly, underprotecting state substantive rights.
Of course, Justice Scalia discussed avoidance only in dicta, and there certainly is a
danger of reading too much into his brief discussion.
Tellingly, however, Justice Scalia turned to discussion of avoidance principles in
Shady Grove only after he had dispelled any notion that Rule 23(b) could be
ambiguous and that avoidance might play a role in interpreting the Rule. Before
considering avoidance principles, Justice Scalia concluded that, by its terms, Rule
23(b) provided that a class action “may be maintained” if the requirements of Rule
23(a) and 23(b) are met. 314 Rule 23(b), Justice Scalia concluded, provides a
categorical, one-size-fits-all formula for determining when a class action may be
maintained. 315 Absent a conclusion that the language of the Rule is ambiguous or
capable of more than one interpretation, no avoidance principle can apply. 316
Further, the “really regulates procedure” standard Justice Scalia recognizes for Rule
validity is extremely Rule protective. 317 What matters is the Federal Rule itself and
what it regulates, not whether the Rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights: “If [a
Rule] governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are
‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will
adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.” 318 Under this standard, Justice Scalia concluded
311

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503, 505 (2001).
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, at 37-38 (1988).
313
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 Scalia, J., opinion of the Court).
314
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court).
315
Id. at 1437, 1440 (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court).
316
See supra note 193.
317
Id. at 1442 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464
(1965); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).
318
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442, 1444 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Miss. Pub’g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
312

42

that Rule 23(b) is simply a claims joinder rule that mandates joinder at plaintiff’s
option when the enumerated conditions of 23(a) and (b) are met. 319

In summary, Justice Scalia backed away from a strong version of an avoidance
canon, and he argued for a standard of Rule validity under which Federal Rules
would rarely, if ever, be found to violate the substantive rights limitation. Both
conclusions protect Congress’s goal of delegating authority to the Supreme Court to
create uniform, predictable, and simple procedural rules for the federal courts and
protect the integrity of the Federal Rules, but, in tandem, they seem also to permit
disservice of Congress’s additional goal that Federal Rules not encroach on
Congress’s substantive rulemaking choices.

Moreover, the Court’s previous decisions in Semtek, Gaspirini, and Walker reveal
its hesitance in permitting Federal Rules regularly to preempt potentially
substantive state law. This reluctance suggests that, if a standard for Rule validity
does not provide for meaningful consideration of substantive rights, the Court will
continue to seek means of avoiding the issue of Rule validity, including continued ad
hoc construction of Rules to accommodate state interests, adoption of a modern or
serious doubts canon of avoidance, promulgation of Rules that more nearly include
only “case processing” or “housekeeping” standards, 320 and perhaps acceptance of
increased suggestions for congressional cooperation or participation in Rule
promulgation. 321
2. Justice Stevens, in Concurrence, Espouses Avoidance Based on Serious
Doubts Regarding Rule Validity

Justice Stevens joined the portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion that discussed
avoidance in dicta, but, in his separate concurrence, he also amplified his views on
avoidance and developed a broader avoidance principle that incorporates a serious
doubts methodology. 322 Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens began his analysis with
the traditional Hanna acknowledgement that REA issues under Erie present two
questions – (1) whether the scope of a Federal Rule is “’sufficiently broad’” to
“’control the issue’ . . ., thereby leaving no room for the operation” of apparently
319
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conflicting state law; 323 and (2) if so, whether the Rule is valid, i.e., constitutional
and in compliance with the substantive rights limitation of the REA. 324 Justice
Stevens, however, concluded that both inquiries can be relevant to the scope of a
Federal Rule. He reasoned that if a Federal Rule appears to violate the substantive
rights proviso, the second “substantive rights” inquiry might “bleed back into the
first” 325 and counsel a narrower construction of the Federal Rule that would avoid a
clash of Federal Rule and state law:
When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive
right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be
interpreted to avoid that impermissible result. . . . And when such a “saving”
construction is not possible and the rule would violate the Enabling Act,
federal courts cannot apply the rule. 326

This formulation adopts the broader doubts model of avoidance, advising
avoidance when it appears that a Rule will impermissibly impact substantive
rights, 327 without requiring the Court to determine that, in fact, the construction of
the Rule would violate the substantive rights limitation (a position that Justice Scalia
seems to prefer in his discussion of avoidance in Shady Grove 328). Justice Stevens
joins his serious doubts model of avoidance with an acknowledgment that the
substantive rights limitation creates a more substantial hurdle than Congress’s
authority to create rules that are “rationally capable of classification as
procedural.” 329 The Court has used the serious doubts avoidance canon in prior
323
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REA cases. 330 It has also used a serious doubts avoidance model to assist in policing
constitutional and statutory boundaries that are, like the substantive rights
limitation, characterized by difficult line-drawing decisions and, thus, can lead to
underenforcement of structural norms, such as separations of powers., 331 and in
policing ambiguous delegations of authority. 332
Under Justice Stevens’s serious doubts conception of avoidance, if a Rule
appears to be in violation of the substantive rights limitation and a narrow
construction is available, a collision of Federal Rule and state law will be averted,
and the court would use an RDA analysis under Erie. 333 When however, “such a
‘saving’ construction is not possible and the rule would violate the Enabling Act,
federal courts cannot apply the rule.” 334 Importantly, Justice Stevens concludes that
it is through a combination of an application of avoidance when available and
finding a Federal Rule invalid when necessary that a court demonstrates “sensitivity
to important state interests” and “regulatory policies.” 335 For Justice Stevens, then,
(as, of course, for Justice Scalia 336) respect for “important state interests” and
“regulatory policies” no longer drives a court’s decision to avoid a conflict, unless the
state law “is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.” 337 Instead,
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concurring in judgment).
330
See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842, 845; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612-13; Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S.
523, 542-44 & n.2 (1984 ) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); accord Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474,
___ (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.), rev’d, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
331
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 56, at 171 (noting the use of avoidance to protect values that may be
underenforced); Young, supra note 56, at 1552-53 (indicating that avoidance canons are particularly
appropriate when the legal standard is characterized by difficulty of drawing bright lines and where
avoidance can help prevent “confrontations between the courts and political branches”).
332
Frickey, supra note 193, at 461-62. Use of the serious doubts canon in Rule interpretation differs from
its use in avoiding constitutional violations. In the constitutional context, the Court is construing a statute
of Congress and may, in avoiding a constitutional decision, find the statute inapplicable in a manner
tantamount to finding it unconstitutional. Avoidance, thus, permits a court to find a statute inapplicable as
a subconstitutional manner and may deny statutory application when a straightforward decision would have
rendered the application at issue constitutional. In the Rule interpretation context, by contrast, avoidance
means that the Supreme Court will find its own Rule inapplicable and will construe Congress’s delegation
to it more narrowly, in furtherance of Congress’s limitation of Court rulemaking. This self-limiting action
of the Court in prospective rulemaking is less suspect than avoidance in the statutory concept, but it may
interfere with Congress’s second goal for rulemaking – the creation of uniform and consistent procedure for
the federal court system.
333
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
334
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
335
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
336
See supra note 309, and accompanying text.
337
Justice Stevens emphasizes that Federal Rules will still be interpreted with “some degree of ‘sensitivity
to important state interests and regulatory policies’ . . . and applied to diversity cases against the
background of Congress’ command that such rules not alter substantive rights and with consideration of
‘the degree to which the rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it
would follow in state courts.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). He would limit the instances in which state law would
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respect for “important state interests” and “regulatory policies” is the result of appropriate
application of the substantive rights limitation, that is, it is the result of the Court’s
construing the Federal Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict if such a construction is
available, and the Court’s corresponding willingness to find a Rule invalid when
necessary. 338
Justice Stevens also defined the substantive rights limitation more broadly than
Justice Scalia, and that broader reach is integral to his conclusion that proper application
of the substantive rights limitation produces the respect for state substantive rights that
Congress requires in the REA. For Justice Stevens, a Federal Rule violates the
substantive rights limitation of the REA if it displaces a state law that is “procedural in
the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” 339
In applying his framework, however, Justice Stevens stops short of using his
carefully considered avoidance canon of interpretation because he determined that the
state law was procedural only. 340 Justice Stevens concedes that one could argue, as the
dissent did, that “class certification [in the face of CPLR § 901(b)’s prohibition on class
actions] would enlarge New York’s ‘limited’ damages remedy” 341 and, thus, that §
901(b) served both procedural and substantive purposes. In fact, Justice Stevens
concluded that there are “two plausible competing narratives” regarding § 901(b) – one
narrative that would present § 901(b) as a procedural rule intertwined with a state right or
remedy and, thus, as a rule that would function to define the scope of the state-created
right 342 and a second narrative that would define § 901(b) as procedural only. 343 In such
an instance, Justice Stevens found it “obvious” that the Court should “respect the plain
textual reading of § 901(b).” 344 In the potential clash of a Federal Rule and a purely
influence a court’s decision to avoid a conflict to those cases in which “the state law actually is part of a
State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.” Id.
338
Justice Stevens realigns a court’s use of “sensitivity to important state interests” and “regulatory
policies” from relying on it to guide avoidance to recognizing it as the result of abiding by the REA
requirement that a Rule not “abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right”:
A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state
law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right. And absent a governing
federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquire, under
the Erie line of cases. This application of the Enabling Act shows “sensitivity to important state
interests,” . . . and “regulatory policies,” . . . but it does so as Congress authorized, by ensuring
that federal rules that ordinarily “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,” § 2072(a),
do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis
added).
339
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
340
Id. at 1457-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
341
Id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
342
Id. at 1459-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
343
Id. at 1457-59 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
344
Id. at 1459-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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procedural state requirement, of course, a Federal Rule will not abridge, enlarge or
modify a substantive right and there is, correspondingly, no need to construe the Federal
Rule narrowly. After developing a more sensitive avoidance canon for the REA analysis,
Justice Stevens’s opinion is disappointing in that it (1) fails to make a contextual
examination of Rule 23(b), including examination of history and Advisory Committee
Notes, to determine if, in fact, the Rule was intended to be mandatory at the plaintiff’s
option; and (2) opts for an unnecessarily restrictive reading of state law. Although the
purpose of this Article is not to resolve conclusively the clash between Rule 23(b) and
CPLR § 901(b), Justice Stevens’s conclusion that there are two competing narratives
regarding § 901(b) is premised on a less than convincing plain meaning construction of
CPLR § 901(b) and a similarly unconvincing conclusion argument that class action
joinder is “classically procedural,” and analogous to setting filing fees or briefing
deadlines. 345
B. Avoidance Based on Respect for Important State Interests

In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, Justice
Ginsburg discusses avoidance based on an accommodation or interest balancing
approach to avoiding conflict. 346 She also states that the Court’s prior opinions have
incorporated an interest balancing approach to avoiding conflict: “In our prior decisions
on point, . . . we have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”347
Avoidance, for Justice Ginsburg, springs directly from federalism concerns 348 and is
not ostensibly limited by the substantive rights prohibition of the REA. Indeed, the
dissent emphasizes repeatedly that the Court has adopted and should continue to
adopt narrowing constructions of Federal Rules to serve important state interests or
regulatory policies. 349

The dissenting opinion is also premised in large part on a marshalling of cases to
establish that the Supreme Court’s pre- and post-Hanna decisions demonstrate
unwavering vigilance in construing “Federal Rules to avoid conflict with state laws”
and “to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.” 350 As discussed
above, the Erie cases do not line up uniformly in support of any brand of avoidance
canon. Avoidance in pre-Hanna cases sought to protect the Federal Rules, not
345

Id. at 1457-79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
347
Id. Justice Ginsburg also references several times an article by former California Supreme Court Justice
Roger J. Traynor entitled, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 668-69 (1959), in
which Justice Traynor recommended an interest balancing approach to reconciling potentially conflicting
state laws. In language similar to that used by Justice Ginsburg in Shady Grove, Justice Traynor counseled
that “courts must be on the alert against making exceptions . . . that would defeat a legitimate interest of the
forum state without serving the interest of any other state.” Id.
348
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 438 & nn.7, 22 (1996))).
349
Id. at 1461-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
350
Id. at 1462-63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
346
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important state interests. 351 Avoidance in post-Hanna cases varied, but has been
based primarily on protecting important state interests and regulatory policies. 352
Allowing an unbounded concept of “state interest” to guide avoidance, 353 however,
rather than the REA’s focus on abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights,
risks returning to the pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna position of elevating, Rule by Rule,
the states’ authority over congressional authority in matters of federal procedure.
Thus, rather than an unadorned interest balancing approach to avoidance, 354
avoidance should be based on the nature and extent of a Federal Rule’s impact on
substantive law.
IV. SERIOUS DOUBTS AS AN APPROPRIATE MODEL FOR AVOIDANCE UNDER THE REA

Because the Court has failed to settle on either a consistent methodology or
an appropriate guiding principle for avoidance, its avoidance jurisprudence in
Enabling Act cases has been inconsistent and has approached the murky quality so
often associated with the Erie doctrine. In this Section, I recognize, first, that
avoidance should be based on separation of powers constraints and, propose,
second, that it be based on the serious doubts model of avoidance that the Court has
often used in REA cases. The methodology for avoidance would, thus, be akin to that
proffered by Justice Stevens in Shady Grove, 355 but the Court should limit the range
of permissible narrowing constructions of a Federal Rule to those that can be
supported by consideration of Rule text and Rule history and purposes, as set forth
in Advisory Committee Notes. 356
This limitation on permissible savings
constructions will prevent ad hoc avoidance and “rewriting” of Federal Rules, but, in
351

As demonstrated above, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court used avoidance to protect the Federal Rule, at issue, not to
avoid trenching on state prerogatives. See supra notes 91-153, and accompanying text. The pre-Hanna
case of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) was construed in Hanna to be
premised on avoidance, but at the time of its issuance, the case was uniformly construed as one in which
state law prevailed over the Federal Rule, under outcome-determinative principles, and it seemed,
moreover, to toll the death knell of the Federal Rules in diversity actions. The use of avoidance in Ragan
thus, would also have protected the Federal Rule not state interests. Pre-Hanna avoidance, thus, provides
scant support for a contemporary avoidance canon premised on protection of state interests and regulatory
policies.
352
See supra notes 186Error! Bookmark not defined.-220, and accompanying text.
353
As Justice Stevens recognized, “[t]he Enabling Act’s limitation does not mean that federal rules cannot
displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its
own rights or remedies.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Only once and indirectly, in quoting Professor Ely, does Justice Ginsburg concedes that “it is
relevant ‘whether the state provision embodies a substantive policy or represents only a procedural
disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting the fairest and most efficient way of conducting
litigation.’” Id. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
354
By contrast, in his suggestion for use of a comparative impairment approach to avoidance, Professor
Lynch would limit the approach to instances in which there is a strong likelihood that the state interest
might affect substantive rights – potential conflicts of Federal Rules and state litigation reform law. See
Lynch, supra note 36.
355
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1451-52 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
356
See supra note 193, and accompanying text.
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cases of serious doubt regarding Rule validity, it will give the nod to protecting
Congress’s superior substantive lawmaking authority. Moreover, if no limiting
construction is available, the framework requires the court to address Rule validity.

Any avoidance canon that will assist in defining the substantive rights
limitation of the REA must recognize that the limitation enforces a separation of
powers boundary, which allocates prospective rulemaking authority to the Supreme
Court but reserves substantive lawmaking choices to Congress. 357 Thus, the Court
should acknowledge that the REA’s prohibition on Rules that “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right” protects against Court Rules that would intrude on
Congress’s substantive lawmaking prerogative.
Professor Burbank’s germinal
article uncovering the historical foundations of the REA reveals the separation of
powers origin of the substantive rights limitation. 358 As Professor Burbank has
emphasized, however, federalism interests are served by the REA’s allocation of
power between the Supreme Court and Congress, but, as a “probable effect, rather
than the primary purpose of the allocation scheme established by the [Rules
Enabling] Act.” 359 The REA’s date of enactment – four years before the Erie decision
– also supports that the purpose was not to protect directly federalism interests. 360
Thus, a court grappling with whether a Rule complies with the substantive rights
limit weighs competing federal interests – the interest in protecting Congress’s
substantive lawmaking authority and Congress’s intent that the Federal Rules be
uniform, predictable, and simple.
The recognition that the substantive rights limitation protects against Court
intrusion into substantive lawmaking choices of Congress means that “sensitivity to
important state interests” and “important state regulatory policies” cannot be the
guiding principle for avoidance. Five justices in Shady Grove recognize the
illegitimacy of unlimited reliance on these factors, 361 but the four dissenting justices
357

Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26.
Id. at 1025-26, 1106-07
359
Id. at 1025-26. Professor Burbank stated as follows:
The relevant substantive rights under the [Rules Enabling] Act, however, are not . . . those that
reflect existing state substantive policy choices on the same subject covered by a Rule. The
purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy is not to protect state or federal policy choices on
such matters, although it may have that effect. Its purpose is, rather, to allocate policy choices – to
determine which federal lawmaking body, the Court or Congress, shall decide whether there will
be federally enforceable rights regarding the matter in question and the content of those rights.
Id. at 1113.
360
Burbank, supra note 23, at
. See also Ely, supra note 15, at 720-21 (“It is true that there is no
evidence to suggest that those responsible for the passage of the Enabling Act – which was finally enacted
in 1934 (four years before Erie) after many years of skirmishing – had the Rules of Decision Act in mind as
a guide to the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s authority”).
361
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1441 n.7 (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court). Justice Scalia observed as follows:
The dissent also suggests that we should read the Federal Rules “’with sensitivity to important
state interests’” and “’to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” . . . The search
for state interest and policies is just as standardless as the “important or substantial” criterion we
rejected in Sibbach v. Wilson. . . .
358
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are insistent that the Court should interpret Federal Rules with “an awareness of,
and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies” 362 and “important state
interests.” 363 Moreover, one searches the majority and concurring opinions in vain
for a direct statement that separation of powers interests animate the substantive
rights limitation. Using state interests, and certainly the unbounded state interests
discussed in the Shady Grove dissent, 364 as the controlling principle of avoidance
elevates state power regarding federal procedure over the authority of both
Congress and its delegate, the Supreme Court. Strikingly, it threatens to create,
Rule-by-Rule, a legal climate eerily similar to the pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna outcomedeterminative period, in which in Federal Rule-state law conflicts, state law seemed
to override the Federal Rules and the Court created dual meanings for Federal
Rules, one of which would apply in diversity cases and the other in federal question
cases. 365 Ultimately, an unbounded interest balancing approach based on important
Id. Justice Stevens, in his separate concurrence, limits, rather than rejects, the application of state interests.
Justice Stevens emphasizes that Federal Rules will still be interpreted with “some degree of ‘sensitivity to
important state interests and regulatory policies’ . . . and applied to diversity cases against the background
of Congress’ command that such rules not alter substantive rights and with consideration of ‘the degree to
which the rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow
in state courts.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citations omitted). He would limit the instances in which state law would influence a court’s
decision to avoid a conflict to those cases in which “the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of
substantive rights or remedies.” Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
362
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
363
Id. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
364
Id. at 1460-61, 1463-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
365
Compare Gavit, supra note 29, at 3. Professor Gavit stated as follows:
[T]he most recent cases have applied an extended version of the doctrine of Erie as against the
Federal Rules; and those cases appear to warrant the broad statement that in a diversity case, in the
event of a conflict between a state rule of procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
federal district court must apply the state rule and not the federal rule if the state advantage is
claimed to be one of “substantial importance.” It appears to be conceded on all fronts that in
litigation involving federal law the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be administered under
the usual standards of interpretation. They are procedure in those cases; yet they are “substance”
in a diversity case.
Id.; Merrigan, supra note 29, at 719. Merrigan similarly concluded as follows:
It is noteworthy that the Court also held in the Ragan case that Rule 3 still prevails in cases
involving only a federal question. In such a case, irrespective of state requirements, the action is
still commenced and the applicable statute of limitations tolled by the mere filing of the complaint.
In sum and substance, therefore, the Court delimited Rule 3 in diversity of citizenship cases, but
preserved it for all other types of civil actions. As a result, all “strictly federal” cases will now be
governed by Rule 3, while diversity cases must of necessity be commenced in accordance with
prevailing state law.
Id. (citations omitted), with Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 743-44. Professors Dudley and
Rutherglen concluded as follows:
The most frequently felt temptation – at least at the Supreme Court level – is to construe federal
law narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law. This was certainly the temptation to which the
Court succumbed in Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek . . . . The . . . unhappy outcome is illustrated
by Walker and West, where supposedly uniform federal procedural rules become two-headed
monsters meaning different things depending on whether the plaintiff’s claim is based on state or
federal law.
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state interests treats the Federal Rule and state law as though they were adopted by
co-equal sovereigns. It permits the law serving the “greater” interest to control or
permits an accommodation of the two laws, but it ignores the constitutional
superiority of federal law in event of conflict and, as applied, it has also minimized
the federal interest in creating a uniform national procedure. 366

The teaching of Hanna is to the contrary– Congress’s delegation of
rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court combined with the Supremacy Clause’s
elevation of federal law over state law require that Federal Rules will preempt some
interests and regulatory policies that are important to states. Similarly, the
supersession clause of the REA permits Federal Rules that do not impact substantive
rights impermissibly to supersede congressional statutes. 367 The Federal Rules,
then, do not operate only when nonconflicting or when in conflict with
“unimportant” federal or state law, but have real power to override laws of both
Congress and the states, as long as the Rules do not impact impermissibly
substantive rights. Furthermore, the REA cases have demonstrated that there is no
identity principle of separation of powers and federalism in construing the
substantive rights limitation. That is, use of a separation of powers principle that
prevents Court Rules from intruding impermissibly into Congress’s substantive
policy choices will protect state law as a residual matter. Use of federalism
principles as the touchstone for avoidance, however, will not protect Congress’s
interest in permitting the Supreme Court to establish uniform procedural Rules for
the federal courts but ensuring that those Rules do not impermissibly impact
substantive rights. Instead, a federalism focus for avoidance permits subordination
of federal procedural rulemaking authority to state law and permits differing
interpretations of the Rules in diversity and federal question cases. Thus, rather
than ensuring protection of the separation of powers boundary in the face of
difficult line drawing issues, use of important state interests and regulatory policies
to guide avoidance may permit state law to override potentially valid Federal
Rules. 368
Reorienting the focus of avoidance to key on preventing Court Rules from
impermissibly abridging substantive rights would be a good first step in
establishing the proper role of avoidance in Enabling Act cases and, with five
justices rejecting unlimited “sensitivity to important state interests” and “important
state regulatory policies” as the basis for limiting Federal Rules, perhaps the Shady
Grove case has taken that first step. There is, in Shady Grove, however, no direct

Id.; Struve, supra note 58, at 1150-51 (concluding that “to the extent the Court views the Enabling Act
limitation as serving federalism, and not separation of powers concerns, . . . the Court’s avoidance doctrine
can produce Rules that have one meaning in diversity cases and another in federal question cases”).
366
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at ___; Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 743-44, 747-48; Hill,
supra note 29, at ___; McCoid, supra note 39, at 898 & n.62.
367
For a discussion of the supersession clause of the REA that permits Federal Rules to supersede
congressional statutes, if in compliance with the substantive rights limitation, see supra note 10.
368
See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). See Burbank, supra note
23, at 1042-46.
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statement that separation of powers concerns animate the substantive rights
limitation. The second step in according avoidance its proper role in defining the
substantive rights limitation is to invoke serious doubts avoidance and to establish a
workable definition for the substantive-procedural divide. Although identification
of that standard is beyond the scope of this Article, an administrable standard is
essential to a serious doubts analysis because the serious doubts avoider must
consider whether there is a serious doubt regarding Rule validity (though she need
not definitely resolve the issue of Rule validity) before turning to possible limiting
constructions for a Federal Rule.

Justice Stevens recommended serious doubts avoidance in his concurrence
in Shady Grove, stating that the second phase of the Hanna inquiry regarding Rule
validity “may well bleed back into the first,” i.e., determination of Rule scope 369:
“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right,
federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to
avoid that impermissible result.” 370 Serious doubts avoidance based on separation
of powers constraints would favor a restrained reading of a Rule, when possible, to
limit tensions between the Supreme Court and Congress caused by the Court’s
exceeding the limitation. 371 The Supreme Court has also used a serious doubts
model in other REA cases. 372 Under the serious doubts model, the first analysis of
scope of the Federal Rule, will involve a look at the second-step Rule validity
analysis. The doubts principle, thus, assumes a shared understanding of the
standard at issue, but that the standard may involve difficult line drawing issues.

The crisper the standard and the easier it is for courts to apply the standard,
the more, theoretically, serious doubts avoidance will play a supporting role, rather
than a leading role, in defining the substantive rights divide. The clear standard of
Hanna, however, which seemed not to provide sufficient protection for state law,
had the opposite effect, causing the Court to search for avenues to avoid apparent
conflicts and that would permit application of the state-protective RDA analysis.
Thus, the Court has demonstrated that an appropriate standard must not only be
clear to reduce reliance on avoidance techniques, it must also be sufficiently
nuanced to include meaningful consideration of all relevant interests. Justice
369

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (citations omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
370
Id.
371
See supra note 332, indicating that use of a serious doubts avoidance principle in Rule interpretation is
less problematic than in narrow construction of a statute to avoid an unconstitional result, because the Court
is self-limiting its own Rule in order to comply with Congress’s separation of powers constraint, rather than
narrowing a congressional statute. The narrowing of a Federal Rule, however, can threaten Congress’s
additional goal in enacting the REA – that the Supreme Court create uniform and consistent Rules for the
federal procedural system.
372
See supra note 39, at 898 & n.62. Professor McCoid observed that the interest in the integrity of the
federal system that is a formative purpose of the Federal Rules and that is emphasized in Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) is not uniformly evidenced in each Rule. He concluded, in fact, that the
interest in “unity of the rules” was not at issue in case of the service Rule at issue in Hanna. Id. That is,
the federal system could tolerate and, in fact, the Rules provided for, varying methods of service.
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Scalia’s proposed clear and easily administrable “really regulates procedure”
standard for Rule validity in Shady Grove, thus, may paradoxically also lead to
increased reliance on avoidance techniques. 373

As the standard for defining the substantive rights limit of the REA becomes
less clear and line-drawing more difficult, of course, courts would turn more often to
avoidance, and here I recommend serious doubts avoidance, which has proved
effective in dealing with standards characterized by difficult line-drawing. 374 With
the REA’s dual interests in protecting substantive rights and protecting the integrity
of federal procedure as an independent court system, it is likely that the Court will
ultimately opt for a standard that does not in all cases permit a bright line
determination of the substantive rights limitation. Indeed, the Court has
demonstrated little satisfaction with the bright line tests it has used in the past –
from outcome determination to “really regulates procedure” to sensitivity to
important state interests (and, for four justices, back again to “really regulates
procedure”). But the ability to interpret a Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict with
apparently substantive law must have limits if avoidance is to serve the purpose of
protecting the separation of powers boundary established in the REA, and if,
additionally, the Rules are to be construed uniformly in diversity and federal
question cases.

Those limits can be found by further analogy to the statutory avoidance
canon. A “cardinal principle” of the statutory avoidance canon is that when
Congress’s intent is clear, that intent, rather, than a limiting interpretation must
govern. 375 And, if a “saving” construction is not available, the Court must address
the constitutional issue. So, too, in the REA context, the Supreme Court has often
stated, when analogizing to a serious doubts model, that a limiting construction of a
Federal Rule may be appropriate, but only “when it is fair to [construe
narrowly].” 376 Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his Shady Grove concurrence, has once
373

See supra note 320-321, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 331-332, and accompanying text.
375
See, e.g., Young, supra note 56, at 1576; see also supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., and
accompanying text.
376
See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp, 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating
that courts should “assume when it is fair to do so that Congress is just as concerned as [the Court has been]
. . . to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in adjudicating claims” and that
limiting constructions may be used “if the text permits”); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that a limiting construction may be adopted “when
the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that impermissible result”); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct.
1441-42 (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court) (recognizing, in dicta that a Rule may be narrowed to serve
avoidance purposes if “susceptible of two meanings” but finding, on the facts of the case, that the Rule was
unambiguous and in direct conflict with state law); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 84245 (1999) (construing Rule more narrowly than text would require in light of “historical antecedents, the
“Advisory Committee’s expressions of understanding,” and potential invalidity of Rule under the
substantive rights limitation of the REA); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13, 620
(1997) (providing that a Rule’s “requirements must be interpreted in keeping with . . . the Rules Enabling
Act, which instructs that rules of procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” and
also that, in construing a Rule, courts “must be mindful that the Rule as now composed sets the
374

53

again concluded that, if a “rule can[not] be reasonably interpreted” to avoid
arguable violation of the substantive rights limitation, then the Court must address
whether the Rule is valid under the REA. 377
Unfortunately, the Court has been less than consistent in determining when a
narrowing construction would be “fair” or “reasonable” and has often declined to
examine Rule history and Advisory Committee Notes when determining the
appropriate reach of a Rule. 378 Commentators have made a persuasive case that
Rules should be interpreted in light of text and Advisory Committee Notes.
Structurally, the case for reliance on Advisory Committee Notes has increased since
the Notes have been subject to additional procedures in the rulemaking process,
including that both the Rule text and Notes are submitted for public comment, both
are subject to revision by the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee, and
both are submitted to the Supreme Court and Congress for approval. 379
Furthermore, the Enablng Act process includes broad input, multiple
decisionmakers, notice and comment periods, and opportunity for review by the
Supreme Court and Congress. 380 Indeed, Professor Bone has concluded that Hanna’s
presumption of Rule validity is based on the “idea that the Rule has been vetted by
the rulemaking process” and, thus, Rule interpretations that are not “sufficiently
connected to the Rules as so vetted” should not be deemed presumptively valid. 381
Similarly, the Court’s failure to stay close to Rule text, history, and purposes as set
forth in Advisory Committee Notes in applying an avoidance canon in Erie cases has
permitted dueling interpretations of a single Rule in diversity and nondiversity
cases. 382
Pragmatically, the Court should also use text and Advisory Committee Notes
to constrain the range of permissible saving constructions when using avoidance in
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Erie cases because the Court has often relied on those sources in other REA
contexts; 383 because using different techniques for Rule interpretation in varying
REA contexts leads to the “two plain meanings for Federal Rules” problem (one in
diversity and one in federal question cases), experienced both in the outcomedeterminative period and currently; and because, when it has not used these
materials, the Court has permitted implausible Rule interpretations in both Erie and
non-Erie, REA cases. 384

Additionally, while I advocate attention to Rule interpretation for the limited
purpose of restraining the range of permissible saving constructions that courts
may adopt for Federal Rules, other commentators have suggested that attention to
history and Advisory Committee context in Rule interpretation may, in fact, reveal
enhanced Federal Rule competence, thereby potentially restricting the need to
resort to avoidance principles. Thus, assessing Rule text and history as set forth in
Advisory Committee Notes may assist both in cabining the permissible range of
limiting constructions of a Rule for avoidance purposes and in establishing greater
breadth of a Rule. For example, Professors Dudley and Rutherglen note that Court
attention to the history and Advisory Committee Notes regarding Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a), in Gaspirini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 385 would have established that Rule
59(a) “was no ordinary federal rule . . . but proceeded from the command of
Congress to avoid any infringement of the right to jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.” 386 They conclude that, if the Gaspirini Court had considered the
history of Rule 59(a), it might have concluded that the Rule incorporated the
provisions of a federal statute and that the Rule could be accorded the higher level
of substantive competence accorded congressional statutes. 387 More broadly,
Professors Burbank and Wolff have suggested that the Court’s promulgation of
open-textured Rules that leave normative choices to trial courts may provide a role
for Supreme Court federal common lawmaking in Rule interpretation. 388
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In summary, using a serious doubts analysis that tethers any limiting
constructions of a Federal Rule to its text, history, and purposes as revealed in
Advisory Committee Notes produces multiple benefits. First, it will permit the
doubts canon to protect the often underenforced structural value of separation of
powers that underlies the REA. Although this Article does not address the Rule
validity standard, it is likely that any standard adopted by the Supreme Court will
present the difficult line-drawing issues that are best protected through a doubts
analysis, since the standard will likely seek to reconcile congressional intent to
permit an integrated national procedural code while retaining for Congress
substantive policy choices. The properly limited serious doubts canon will err on
the side of protecting Congress’s substantive prerogative in instances of doubt, but,
when limited by text, history, and purposes as adduced in the Enabling Act process,
it will stop short of permitting a “rewriting” of the Federal Rule. If Rule text and
history do not permit a limiting construction, then the Court must proceed to the
question of Rule validity. Second, by protecting Congress’s substantive lawmaking
choices, the court additionally protects federalism interests, but as the result of
protecting Congress’s substantive policy choices, not as the goal of avoidance.
Third, it will protect Court rulemaking. Unbounded avoidance imposed to serve the
goal of protecting state interests and regulatory policies permits differing
interpretations for Federal Rules depending on whether the case is heard in state or
federal court and threatens to return to the pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna era in which
state procedural law was elevated above Federal Rules and federal statutes. Fourth,
this serious doubts framework harmonizes the methodology for avoidance in Erie
and non-Erie REA cases because in each REA context – Federal Rule-state law
conflict, congressional statute-Federal Rule conflict, or in general Rule construction
– the same issue of whether the Court Rule impinges impermissibly on Congress’s
rulemaking prerogative is raised.
I. CONCLUSION

The Court has long relied on avoidance to assist in policing the uncertain
boundary of the substantive rights limitation of the REA, and, thus, to decide
whether a Federal Rule or state law should prevail in event of an apparent Federal
Rule-state law conflict. The Court’s reliance on avoidance, however, has been
inconsistent and improperly focused on federalism concerns. This Article suggests
that use of avoidance remains appropriate, but it narrows instances of reliance on
avoidance (1) by recognizing that “important state interests and regulatory powers”
may not serve as the guiding principle of avoidance because the substantive rights
limitation is premised on separation of powers purposes rather than federalism
purposes; and (2) by limiting, through interpretation based on Rule text and
Advisory Committee Notes, the available savings constructions for a Rule.
Furthermore, the proposal to use a serious doubts method of avoidance recognizes
the importance of the competing federal principles under the substantive rights
limitation of the REA -- the integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent system and
the preservation to Congress of substantive lawmaking authority. Nevertheless, in
instances of serious doubt as to whether a Federal Rule violates the substantive
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rights limitation, it recognizes that the REA limitation regarding separation of
powers is part of the “constitution outside the Constitution” 389 and that the
constitutional and statutory value should be protected.
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